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Executive Summary
Funded by an Australian Research 
Council (ARC) Linkage grant over four 
years (2009–13), the Major Infrastructure 
Procurement project sought to find more 
effective and efficient ways of procuring 
and delivering the nation’s social and 
economic infrastructure by investigating 
constraints relating to construction 
capacity, competition, and finance in new 
public sector major infrastructure.1 The 
research team comprised researchers 
in construction economics and finance 
from Queensland University of Technology 
(QUT), Griffith University (GU), The 
University of Hong Kong (UHK), and The 
University of Newcastle (UoN). Project 
partners included state government 
departments and agencies responsible for 
infrastructure procurement and delivery 
from all Australian mainland states, and 
private sector companies and peak 
bodies in the infrastructure sector (see 
“Introduction” for complete list).
There are a number of major outcomes 
from this research project. The first of these 
is a scientifically developed decision-
making model for procurement of 
infrastructure that deploys a novel and 
state-of-the-art integration of dominant 
microeconomic theory (including theories 
developed by two Nobel Prize winners). 
The model has been established 
through empirical testing and substantial 
experiential evidence as a valid and 
reliable guide to configuring procurement 
of new major and mega infrastructure 
projects in pursuance of superior Value-
for-Money (VfM). The model specifically 
addresses issues of project size, bundling 
of contracts, and exchange relationships. 
In so doing, the model determines the 
suitability of adopting a Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) mode.
We must find ways to make better use of existing infrastructure, remove the 
bottlenecks and gaps that are holding back Australia’s growth, and identify 
opportunities for new capital investment.
(Source: Sir Rod Eddington, Chair, Infrastructure Australia, A report to the Council of Australian 
Governments, December 2008)
It is essential to reform governance and institutional arrangements for public 
infrastructure to promote better decision-making in project selection, funding, 
financing and the delivery of services from new and existing infrastructure.
(Source: Productivity Commission: Public Infrastructure, Inquiry Report, Vol.1(71) May 2014)
”
” 
“
“
2008
2014
1 This research was supported under Australian Research Council’s Linkage Projects funding scheme (project number LP0989743).
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The project has also developed 
dominant international business 
theory on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to explain, for the first time, 
the overseas bidding decision of 
multinational contractors into Australia. 
This new theory has been successfully 
tested through case studies of the 
world’s largest multinational contractors 
and their willingness to bid for public 
sector major roads, bridges and tunnels 
in Australia. This work demonstrates that 
there is significant room for improving 
the workings of the market to increase 
competition through the reform of a wide 
range of institutional, governance and 
procurement policies and practices, 
and the creation of more confidence 
in published pipelines. This major 
research outcome shows the effect 
of national culture on perceptions of 
attractiveness of public sector road, 
bridge, and tunnel projects in Australia. 
For example, if government wishes to 
attract new entrants from our region 
(such as Japan and China) into the 
National Prequalification System, then 
it needs to intensify efforts to reform 
transaction cost-related issues that 
generate risk (including high bidding 
costs) and to improve contractors’ 
perceived project returns (without 
necessarily increasing prices, however). 
Collectively, these matters concerning 
risk and return speak to the location 
factor as the key determinant of FDI in 
the context of multinational contracting. 
In part, these outcomes could be 
achieved by exploring ways to ensure 
that any perceptions of bias – albeit 
subconscious and inadvertent – are 
avoided in the tender process, and 
very carefully examining ways in 
which government can avoid creating 
perceptions that they are a threat  
to profits.
Additionally, the major outcomes of 
the research project include new 
insights into long-term benefits and 
risks of infrastructure financing and 
investment decisions, including, for 
the first time, empirical evidence that 
supports the finance and investment 
characteristics of PPPs for infrastructure 
development. For example, the research 
has established evidence that:
 » Investors do not earn additional 
returns by owning Australian PPP 
bonds in comparison to owning any 
other bonds in the Australian debt 
market;
 » ASX-listed toll-road PPPs show 
an increase in company-specific 
(idiosyncratic) risk of these 
investments as the project shifts 
from the construction phase to the 
operations phase;
 » A constant return of the risk-free 
rate plus 6% per annum is the best 
predictor of infrastructure and PPP 
one-month returns; and
 » Governments, superannuation funds 
and private individuals interested 
in a broad and diversified exposure 
to infrastructure need to recognise 
that the long-term risks in these 
investments are similar to those of a 
diversified holding of US stocks.
Furthermore, the research project has 
established a number of advances in 
knowledge that arise from connecting 
the outcomes of the procurement 
and finance themes. For example, 
deployment of the new procurement 
decision-making model would address 
a number of perceived administrative 
barriers that are adversely affecting 
new entrants and, at the same time, 
configure and present new infrastructure 
projects to the market in a way that 
nurtures both local contractors and 
new international contractors. The 
research also sheds new light on the 
relationship between construction 
capacity/competition and available/
affordable finance. For example, the 
finance outcomes support long-term 
investors including superannuation 
funds becoming engaged at an early 
stage of an infrastructure/PPP project. 
At the same time, the new procurement 
decision-making model reflects the 
long-term objectives of approaches 
that see the Operator as having greater 
influence over the design of the facility. 
That is, this new procurement model 
searches for viable Design, Construct, 
Operate and Maintain bundles as a 
pre-requisite of a successful PPP. In 
turn, it identifies the best projects for 
long-term investors to consider, and 
provides the best scope for the operator 
to influence design. 
The major outcomes of this research 
project are critically important, 
particularly as they relate to the terms 
of reference of the Productivity 
Commission’s inquiry into public 
infrastructure, and to the Productivity 
Commission’s (2014a, p.461) note 
(with respect to this research project) 
that, “ the Reforming the Procurement of 
Construction and Financing of Australian 
Infrastructure: Advancing Capacity, 
Competition and Investment project is 
examining a range of relevant issues, 
including the influence of competition 
during the tendering process on 
best value for money outcomes from 
procurement processes”.2  
2 Productivity Commission (2014a). Public infrastructure, Inquiry Report. Vol.2 (No. 71 May). Canberra: Australian Government.
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The Project
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 ARC Linkage project grant 
application noted that investing in and 
delivering new infrastructure plays 
a key part in the efforts of Australian 
federal and state governments to 
improve productivity, ensure continued 
economic growth, and reverse upward 
pressure on inflation. At the time of the 
application, all state governments were 
budgeting to increase infrastructure 
spending in real terms. Moreover, 
in the May 2008 budget the Federal 
Government announced the Building 
Australia Fund (BAF), which received 
an initial allocation of around $20 billion 
to fund critical infrastructure that was 
not being provided by the states or the 
private sector. In addition to the BAF, 
the Federal Government invested $22.3 
billion in land transport infrastructure 
from 2009. 
The key problem identified in the grant 
application was that the ability of federal 
and state governments to provide VfM 
in delivering infrastructure is severely 
constrained by the lack of construction 
capacity, competition, and finance in 
major infrastructure sectors. Indeed, 
as the 2008 project application noted, 
this situation is not surprising given 
that only two of the world’s largest 225 
multinational contractors are Australian-
based (ENR, 2005)3, and that the 
then federal minister responsible for 
infrastructure was reported as saying, 
“The world’s biggest construction 
companies need to be attracted to 
Australia to cut the costs of building 
infrastructure”.4 Because governments 
had identified partnerships with the 
private sector (including leveraging 
private finance from PPPs) as an 
important part of their infrastructure 
delivery strategy, the credit crisis of 
2008 also loomed as a key constraint in 
achieving VfM in infrastructure delivery. 
These two key constraints – construction 
capacity/competition and finance 
availability – were made more intractable 
by virtue of their close relationship. 
The project, as formulated in 2008, 
aimed to deliver new procurement and 
financial modelling, and to explore 
the relationship between construction 
capacity/competition and finance 
availability/affordability as the basis for 
procurement reform to address these 
infrastructure delivery constraints. 
Since 2008, however, there have been 
key changes in the area of financing. 
Severe constraints in available finance 
have shifted from the private sector 
to government. The capacity of 
governments to finance projects through 
further public borrowing has for now 
and the foreseeable future become 
acutely difficult. Moreover, some states 
may also be concerned to protect their 
credit ratings. By contrast, conditions 
for the private sector since the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) have eased. As 
noted by the Productivity Commission 
(2014b), “There is no shortage of private 
sector capital that could potentially be 
deployed to finance public infrastructure 
in Australia” (p. 33). The key challenge 
in leveraging private finance has now 
shifted to accessing this finance at the 
‘right price’.5
On the other hand, construction 
capacity and competition constraints 
have not significantly eased since 
2008 and, if anything, have worsened – 
particularly in the light of restructuring 
at Lend Lease, which means that 
Baulderstone and AbiGroup no longer 
exist as separate bidding entities. The 
Productivity Commission (2014a, p. 421) 
“...estimates that they (Leighton and 
Lend Lease) have been involved in just 
over 60 per cent of major infrastructure 
projects (by value)”. The Productivity 
Commission (2014a) also observes 
that, “…international firms are yet to 
command a substantial share of the 
market. Moreover, in many cases, these 
firms find it necessary to partner with 
or join a consortium involving a local 
firm. The Commission estimates that 
international contractors have been 
involved in just over 18 per cent of 
infrastructure projects costing more 
than $50 million”.6 To the best of the 
research team’s knowledge, there 
has been no significant advance in 
understanding the relationship between 
construction capacity/competition and 
the availability/affordability of finance 
since 2008. Clearly, the project’s aims 
remain critically important, particularly 
as they relate to the terms of reference 
of the Productivity Commission’s inquiry 
that seek to “conduct a broad ranging 
investigation into costs, competitiveness 
and productivity in the provision 
of nationally significant economic 
infrastructure and examine ways to: 
reduce infrastructure construction costs; 
address any barriers to private sector 
financing, including assessing the role 
and efficacy of alternative infrastructure 
funding and financing mechanisms, 
and recommending mechanisms and 
operating principles that may be applied 
to overcome these barriers” (2014a, p. v). 
3 ENR: Engineering News-Record (2005). The top global contractors. ENR: Engineering News-Record, 255(8).
4 Cameron, F. (2008). High bidding costs – not competition – blamed for building woes. Australian. April 18.
5 Productivity Commission (2014b). Public infrastructure, Draft Report. Vol.1 (March). Canberra: Australian Government. 
6 Productivity Commission (2014a). Public infrastructure, Inquiry Report. Vol.2 (No. 71 May). Canberra: Australian Government.
 < 7
With respect to this research project, 
the Productivity Commission (2014a, 
p.461) notes that, “The Reforming 
the Procurement of Construction and 
Financing of Australian Infrastructure: 
Advancing Capacity, Competition and 
Investment project is examining a range of 
relevant issues including the influence of 
competition during the tendering process 
on best value for money outcomes from 
procurement processes”.7 This final 
report is also intended to assist the 
Australian Government’s response to 
the Productivity Commission’s inquiry 
into Public Infrastructure (May 2014). To 
this end, amongst the report’s footnotes 
connections are made between the 
research project and a number of  
key points in the Productivity 
Commission’s inquiry. 
This final project report encapsulates 
the findings from four years of research 
conducted by four universities in 
partnership with 11 government 
(including all five mainland state 
treasury departments) and industry 
partners. This was an unprecedented 
collaboration in the field of infrastructure 
procurement and financing, not simply 
in scale, but also in intellectual scope. 
The multidisciplinary research team 
comprised researchers from QUT, GU, 
UHK, and UoN. The project partners 
were a unique and committed group 
of public and private industry partners 
representing the full spectrum of new 
infrastructure development and delivery:
 » Government: Department of 
Treasury and Finance, Victoria; New 
South Wales Treasury; Queensland 
Treasury and Trade; Western 
Australia Department of Finance; 
South Australia Department of 
Treasury and Finance; former 
Queensland Department of 
Infrastructure and Planning.
 » Industry: Construction Industry 
Institute Australia; Infrastructure 
Association Queensland; Aurecon; 
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia; 
and former Coffey Commercial 
Advisory.
A Research Advisory Committee 
(RAC), consisting of executives and 
senior managers from the partner 
organisations, was established to act as 
an advisory panel for the project. The 
combined expertise and experience 
of these panel members enabled the 
receipt of informed advice, stakeholder 
perspectives, and reviews of the 
functions and operations of the research. 
In particular, the RAC meetings provided 
a forum where the research team could 
present progress reports and test model 
development. RAC meetings were held 
two or three times a year for the four 
years of the project. The final meeting, 
which finalised the timeline for the 
approval and public dissemination of 
this final report, was held in May 2014. 
In addition, the Core Management 
Team of senior university-based 
members of the project oversaw the 
implementation of the Research Plan 
and Program, which incorporated 
the Project Management Plan and 
Strategy (including ethics approval and 
compliance). The Core Management 
Team members were Adrian Bridge 
(QUT), Robert Bianchi (GU), Martin 
Skitmore (QUT), and Eduardo Roca 
(GU). The research team comprised the 
following chief investigators:
Associate Prof Adrian Bridge (Project 
lead/first-named investigator)
Associate Prof Robert Bianchi
Prof Martin Skitmore
Prof Eduardo Roca
Prof Steve Rowlinson (Partner 
Investigator, UHK)
Dr Tom Kwok (retired, formerly QUT)
Jason Gray (QUT)
Marcus Jefferies (UoN)
The project’s findings are drawn from 
the Major Infrastructure Procurement 
research outputs, which are available at:
 » https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/
arcmip/ or
 » http://eprints.qut.edu.au/view/
person/Bridge,_Adrian.html
The views expressed in this final report 
represent those of the research team but 
do not necessarily represent the views of 
any of the project partners.
7 Productivity Commission. (2014a). Public infrastructure, Inquiry Report. Vol.2 (No. 71 May). Canberra: Australian Government.
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RESEARCH DESIGN  
AND METHODS
The four-year project was divided into 
two main themes: a procurement theme 
and a finance theme. Initially, the project 
studied the two themes independently. 
However, it then considered their 
interdependence, as depicted in 
Illustration 1.
An individual PhD study of each 
objective in the procurement theme 
(Objectives #1 and #2) and in the 
finance theme (Objectives #3 and 
#4) was conducted. Overall, the 
project adopted a mixed-method 
approach involving qualitative and 
quantitative data (sourced from surveys, 
case studies, in-depth interviews, 
comprehensive documents, and 
leading-edge financial data bases) 
and analysis (using a wide range of 
statistical procedures).
THE PROCUREMENT THEME
The procurement theme investigated 
the potential of procurement policies 
and practices to increase construction 
capacity and competition. The theme 
was sub-divided into two objectives: the 
domestic major infrastructure construction 
market and the international major 
construction market. Each objective 
formed the basis of a PhD study.
Objective #1 was an investigation of the 
effect of procurement on VfM, including 
competition and flexible contracting 
arrangements to deal with changes to 
the works. It involved the development 
and testing of a new (first-order) 
procurement decision-making model to 
determine the suitability of PPPs in major 
and mega infrastructure projects. 
To address Objective #1, data was 
collected and analysed from:
 » A survey of major road and health 
projects that covered project 
scope, procurement and tendering 
procedure. (Government agencies 
submitted a total of 87 projects 
worth $32 billion, which were 
analysed as a representative 
sample. The projects were 
undertaken in the period 2005–
2010, with an approximately equal 
number on either side of the GFC.)
 » Case studies of major road and 
health projects. (These studies 
included access to all key 
documents that informed the actual 
procurement decision, and lengthy 
interviews with senior executives 
and senior managers involved in 
the actual procurement decision. 
A summary of the cases is given in 
Illustration 6.)
 » A nationwide survey of civil and 
building contractors. (This survey 
covered structure-conduct-
performance attributes of the major 
civil and building sectors, including 
construction capacity in the period 
2005–2010. A total of 60 responses 
were received out of the 199 sent to 
all pre-qualified contractors across 
the five mainland states.)
Objective #2 aimed to reveal the 
determinants of multinational 
contractors’ willingness to bid for 
Australian Public Sector Major 
Infrastructure projects. To this end, data 
was collected and analysed from:
 » Case studies of nine Tier 
1 multinational contractors 
headquartered outside of Australia. 
(These studies included the 
analysis of private documents, and 
lengthy interviews with contractors 
to obtain answers to the case 
study questionnaire that covered 
technical, service, financial and 
system management attributes; 
potential competitive advantages; 
threats to profits in home country 
and in Australia; the supply chain 
in Australia; attractiveness of the 
Australian market; barriers to entry; 
and business motivation. Interviews 
were held in Beijing, Madrid and 
Tokyo. With regard to the US 
multinational contractors, interviews 
were held in two state capital cities 
in Australia.)
Procurement Theme
(Objectives #1 and #2)
Finance Theme
(Objectives #3 and #4)
Relationship between Procurement Theme and Finance Theme
Illustration 1
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 » Seven studies of local contractors 
(Again, these studies involved 
analysis of private documents and 
lengthy interviews to answer a 
questionnaire that focused on the 
key resources and attributes of Tier 
1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 contractors, 
with at least two contractors from 
each of the three tiers.)
 » An extensive range of secondary 
sources (including contractors’ 
websites, industry-related 
publications, Hofstede’s cultural 
model, the Corruption Perception 
Index, the Euromonitor International, 
Transparency International, 
World Bank, IBIS World Australia, 
Euromonitor Country Ratings  
and others.)
THE FINANCE THEME
The finance theme investigated 
ways of improving the availability 
and affordability of private finance 
for infrastructure. The theme was 
sub-divided into two objectives that 
covered the finance and investment 
characteristics of PPPs and 
infrastructure investments (both equity 
and debt). Each objective formed the 
basis of a PhD study. 
Objective #3 was an investigation into 
risk and return behaviour of Australian 
PPP (bonds and listed equities), and 
the cost of capital of Australian-listed 
PPP equities. To address Objective #3, 
data from the following sources were 
collected and analysed:
 » PPP bonds in the UBS Australia 
Composite Bond Index, including 
Civic Nexus, Lane Cove Tunnel, 
Praeco, Royal Women’s Hospital 
Partnership, and Axiom Education 
Qld (AEQ).
 » ASX-listed toll road PPPs 
(Connecteast, Hills Motorway, 
Rivercity Motorways and 
Transurban).
 » Australian stock returns, sub-
divided into various categories 
(including their broad sectors, 
industries, infrastructure-based 
indices and a portfolio of PPP 
stocks).  
Objective #4 was an investigation into 
the long-term US infrastructure returns 
and portfolio selection from 1927 to 2010. 
To address Objective #4, long-term US 
infrastructure index returns from 1927 to 
2010 were collected and analysed.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
PROCUREMENT AND 
FINANCE THEMES AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH
During the project’s application and 
scoping in 2008, there appeared to be 
a decline in construction capacity in 
some sectors of the major infrastructure 
market. This decline was inadvertently 
exacerbated post-GFC by government 
increasingly using PPPs in which only a 
small number of contractors were able 
to participate, mainly due to financial 
constraints including high bidding 
costs. There remains an urgent need to 
investigate this decline in construction 
capacity. This project, through its 
procurement and finance themes, offers 
the chance to consider more clearly 
the effect of improved availability and 
affordability of finance on construction 
capacity, and conversely the effect of 
reformed procurement practices and 
policies concerning construction capacity 
and competition on the availability and 
affordability of finance. The need for future 
research was also considered in light of 
the project findings.
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Findings
Procurement Theme
The Major Infrastructure Procurement research project findings present world-
first modelling of procurement decision-making and multinational contracting 
(procurement theme), along with new insights into debt and equity risk and return 
characteristics of Australian PPPs and long-term US infrastructure returns and 
portfolio selection (finance theme). These advances in knowledge also allow a 
new perspective on the relationship between procurement and finance and an 
improved foresight in the direction of future research. Findings are presented 
below according to theme and objective.
There is no clear data to conclude whether the use of PFI has led to demonstrably 
better or worse value for money than other forms of procurement.  
(Source: National Audit Office. 2011. Lessons from PFI and other projects (HC 920 Session 2010-2012). 
London: The Stationery Office.)
“ ”
The world’s biggest construction companies need to be attracted to Australia to 
cut the costs of building infrastructure.
(Source: Cameron, F. 2008. High bidding costs – not competition – blamed for building woes. Australian. April 18.)
“ ”
 < 11
BACKGROUND
The question of procurement is vexed 
because there is a dearth of cost and 
performance data across the whole-life of 
infrastructure facilities, both in PPPs and 
in non-PPPs. In particular, there is a very 
significant gap in our knowledge of the 
effect of facilities on front-line service. For 
example, we are yet to fully understand the 
way educational outcomes are affected 
by a school being built and delivered by a 
PPP or a non-PPP. This lack of knowledge 
is due largely to the intractability of data, 
including the difficulty of isolating the effect 
of the facility from other important factors 
on front-line outcomes. Again, in schools 
for example, we are faced with the difficulty 
of isolating the effect of the school facility 
on educational outcomes from factors 
such as the quality of teaching and the 
nature of the student cohort. In relation to 
non-PPPs, Thomas (2011) argues that a 
lack of transparency and accountability 
arises from widely dispersed budgets.8 
Moreover, although whole-life facility 
costs in PPPs may be more readily known 
at least to government (as they largely 
consist of service/availability charges and 
variation costs paid to the PPP Company), 
these costs only represent production 
costs (finance, design, construction, 
operation and maintenance costs) and 
ignore transaction costs. Transaction 
costs, materialise internally (for example, 
bureaucracy and supervision costs) and 
externally (for example, pre-contract 
including the process of establishing a 
price and post-contract including contract 
management), and are not fully recorded 
and reported anywhere in the world. 
Despite this limited knowledge of whole-life 
facility costs, we do know much more about 
the differences in costs and performance 
of PPPs and non-PPPs to the end of the 
construction/start of operations of facilities. 
For example, Raisbeck, Duffield, and Xu 
(2010) present evidence to show that PPPs 
deliver less variation in time and cost to 
the start of operations.9 That is not to say, 
however, that PPP outperforms traditional 
delivery and other non-PPP approaches 
in absolute terms of minimum time and/or 
cost. And again, these measures of time 
and costs are production-based only and 
ignore transaction costs.10
PPP suitability criteria/drivers and 
Procurement Option Analysis (that is 
known in academic literature as Multiple 
Attribute Utility Approach) are amongst 
the key tools used in current practice to 
determine procurement. The suitability 
criteria/drivers are vague indicators or 
filters and, given that our knowledge of the 
relative merits of procurement is largely 
restricted to production costs only and to 
the end of construction/start of operations, 
it is not surprising that Procurement 
Option Analysis amounts to matching 
some perceived feature of stereotypical 
procurement to some desirable outcome at 
the end of construction/start of operations. 
This often equates to cost and/or to time 
certainty or minimisation. By definition, this 
is a short-term approach and the process 
of going from required outcome at the end 
of construction/start of operations (read 
effect) to selection of the procurement 
mode (read cause) is tautological and non-
scientific. This is because cause and effect 
are expressed in the same terms. 
This current practice in procurement 
decision-making also becomes susceptible 
to non-economic forces, particularly in the 
public sector in many countries (including 
Australia). Illustration 2 indicates the 
possibility of a short-term tendency of 
public sector procurement, at least in the 
public road and health sector in Australia, 
where only five projects (mostly PPPs) out 
of the 87 major projects surveyed include 
operations and/or maintenance with 
construction as part of the contract bundle.
The short-term and circular nature of 
current procurement decision-making 
tools calls into question whether other 
procurement patterns are also counter-VfM. 
For example, other procurement patterns 
in the survey of major road and health 
include:
 » A low number of higher value projects 
account for an appreciably higher 
proportion of the overall value;11 
 » The majority of road and health 
projects are delivered as single 
contracts;
 » Larger value projects (over 
$100m) are dominated by Design 
and Construct, Alliancing, Early 
Contractor Involvement, and 
Managing Contractor approaches, 
which exclude operations and/or 
maintenance as part of the contract; 
 » The budget established in 
collaboration with the contractor 
(including a pain share/gain share 
regime) in the majority of health 
projects; and
 » 57 percent of projects in the sample 
have EoI that lie below 5 or above 8 
(the significance of this EoI range is 
explained later in these findings).
Objective #1 The effect of procurement on value for money (competition and flexibility of contracting arrangement/s to 
deal with changes to the works) and development and testing of a new (first-order) procurement decision-making model 
to determine the suitability of Public-Private Partnerships in major and mega infrastructure projects.
8 Thomas, P. (2011). The evidence for and against PFI, Infrastructure Journal [http://www.ijonline.com/genv2/Secured/printArticle.aspx?ArticleID=67975. Accessed 9 March 2011.
9 Raisbeck, P., Duffield, C., & Xu, M. (2010). Comparative performance of PPPs and traditional procurement in Australia. Construction Management and Economics, 28(4), 345-359. 
10 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 115).To clarify the PC’s mention of relative performance of PPPs, we are data poor on both PPPs and non-PPPs in terms of their performance and 
relative effect on front-line service in operations and also data poor with regard to PPPs on many attributes other than time and cost variation during construction. We return to this 
point in the section on future research. 
11 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 452). The PC noted a comment from Austrade who had been advised by international firms that contracts awarded in Australia are of a relatively 
large size.
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Survey of major road and health projects
 » Project size/value
 › The total value of the 87 projects is AUD 32.297 
billion (comprising AUD 22.143 billion road projects 
and AUD 10.154 billion health projects) and across 
these projects a low number of higher value 
projects account for an appreciably higher 
proportion of the overall value
 › That is, in roads 40 of the submitted road 
projects (66 percent) comprise the two lower 
value/most frequently occurring categories 
(between AUD 50 to 100 million and AUD 100 
to 250 million) and which account for AUD 
4.164 billion (19 percent) of the total value 
of the submitted road projects. At the same 
time, 10 of the submitted road projects (16 
percent) fall in the two higher value categories 
(between  AUD 500 million to AUD 1 billion, 
and more than AUD 1 billion) and which 
accounts for AUD 13.847 billion (63 percent) 
of the total value of the submitted road projects
 › In terms of health projects, 17 of submitted 
the health projects (65 percent) comprise the 
two lower value/most frequently occurring 
categories (between AUD 50 to100 million and 
AUD 100 to 250 million) and which accounts 
for AUD 2.024 billion (20 percent) of the total 
value of the submitted health projects. At the 
same time, five of the health projects  (19 
percent) fall in the two higher value categories 
(between AUD 500 million to $1 billion, and 
more than $1 billion) and which accounts for 
AUD 6.593 billion (65 percent) of the total 
value of the submitted health projects
 › The majority of road and health projects (62 
projects, or 71 percent of the submitted projects 
representing AUD 19.406 billion, or 60 percent of 
the value of submitted projects) are delivered as 
a single contract and in terms of projects delivered 
as multiple contracts, these tend to comprise the two 
lower value categories and below AUD 250 million. 
 » Bundling
 › With regard to the 61 road projects lower value 
projects ($50-100m) are dominated by Construct 
Only (24 projects) whilst the larger value projects 
over $100m are dominated by Design and 
Construct (in 15 projects); Alliancing (in 14 
projects); and Early Contractor Involvement (in 6 
projects); Leaving only two projects that comprise 
Design, Construct; Operations and Maintenance 
(including a PPP) 
 › On the other hand, Managing Contractor in 13 
projects (and of these projects eight were greater 
than AUD 100 million) dominated the health 
projects submitted; Again only a small number of 
projects comprise Design, Construct; Operations 
and Maintenance (namely three PPPs) 
 » Expressions of Interest (EoI)
 › The following histogram shows that 57% projects 
in the sample of 87 projects (or 45 projects out 
of 79 projects, with missing data on 8 projects) 
have EoI that lie below 5 or above 8 
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A NEW APPROACH 
The UK National Audit Office (2004) defines 
procurement as “the whole-life process 
of the acquisition of goods, services and 
works..., beginning when a potential 
requirement is identified and ending with the 
conclusion of service contract or ultimate 
disposal of an asset”.12 HM Treasury (2008) 
defines VfM as “securing the best mix of 
quality and effectiveness for the least outlay 
over the period of use of the goods or 
services bought. It is not about minimising 
upfront prices”.13 The best mix can, in turn, 
be interpreted as the best ratio between 
benefit (utility/return) and cost, or VfM = f 
(cost/benefit). More specifically, benefits 
comprise largely front-line/user utility and 
given a whole-of-life concern, costs include 
both production costs (design, construction, 
operations and maintenance, DCOM costs) 
and transaction costs. In turn, transaction 
costs comprise both internal management 
costs to the buyer (in this case, government) 
and more tangible external transaction 
costs.14
The pursuit of VfM through the procurement 
of new infrastructure demands the 
deployment of state-of-the-art economic 
theory. However, such an approach has 
so far been overlooked by government 
agencies around the world. In particular, 
a substantial body of empirically tested 
and Nobel Prize-winning economic theory 
on procurement that draws on the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) can be 
deployed to optimise VfM. Illustration 3 
depicts this potential (bottom row), as 
opposed to current practice (top boxes).
The key point of difference for the new 
approach based on economic theory is the 
early identification of design, construction, 
operations and maintenance activity 
from an economic, rather than technical, 
perspective. Given the appreciable 
information gap at the schematic design 
stage, this approach facilitates a far more 
appropriate level of risk analysis; that is, 
the identification of economic activity within 
the project (government versus market 
specialisation), the assessment of each 
item of economic activity (using a novel 
integration of NIE theories and resource-
based theory), and the analysis of bundles 
of activity (through a set of optimising 
procedures) avoid guesswork at this early 
stage of project design and allows for a 
meaningful allocation of risk.
Moreover, this approach is wholly scientific 
in that the procurement decision is informed 
by the upstream project attributes, including 
the unique buyer-supplier environment 
surrounding the project, rather than by 
downstream outcomes at the end of 
construction/start of operations. In other 
words, the analysis runs from cause to effect 
and cause, or the procurement mode is 
expressed in different terms from the effect, 
which is VfM or cost/benefit ratio. 
The project has developed a procurement 
decision-making model based on this new 
approach that applies relevant economic 
theory to procurement. Illustrations 4 and 5 
depict the key analytical tasks in this model. 
The model develops a procurement strategy 
based on identifying and sizing externalised 
activity, optimising and sizing bundles of this 
externalised activity, and choosing the most 
efficient type of contract to use with each 
bundle. More fundamentally, the model 
searches for viable DCM or DCOM bundles 
to realise benefits of design innovation in 
terms of minimising whole-life costs and 
enhancing front-line operations.15
12 National Audit Office (2004). Improving procurement: Progress by the Office of Government Commerce in improving departments’ capability to procure cost-effectively. London: 
Office of Public Sector Information. 
13 HM Treasury (2008). Infrastructure procurement: Delivering long-term value. London: Office of Public Sector Information.
14 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 70). The PC recognise the key role of economic efficiency including competition in defining VfM. 
15 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 26 and p.64). The new model is consistent with the PC’s mention that allocating risks to the entity best able to manage them and that this 
depends on the project. The new model would more reliability allocate risks to the party best able to manage these risks. The new model would also deliver the right sizing and 
which corresponds to the PC comment concerning substantial dividends from scoping.
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The new (first-order) procurement 
decision-making model was tested on 
four major projects: two health projects 
and two road projects. For theorectical 
reasons, projects at either end of the 
EoI scale (Illustration 2) were chosen, a 
health project with 15 EoI (Health Case 
#2) and a road project with 2 EoI  
(Road Case #2). The other health project 
(Health Case #1) and road project (Road 
Case #1) were selected at random from 
projects within the band of 5-8 EoI. The 
new (first-order) procurement decision-
making model closely matched the 
actual procurement strategy in two of 
the case studies, Health Case #1 (a PPP 
project with 5 EoI) and Road Case #1 
(a Construct Only road project with 8 
EoI). However, the new model generated 
an appreciably different procurement 
strategy from that actually used in Health 
Case #2 (a Managing Contractor project 
with 15 EoI) and in Road Case #2 (an 
Alliance project with 2 EoI). Some of 
the key lessons from these cases are 
highlighted in Illustration 6.16
Initial Schematic Design
Initial Activity Analysis
Supporting Market Analysis 
Bundling Analysis
Exchange Relationship Analysis
Procurement Strategy
Stage 3
Stage 2 
Stage 1
Schematic of new procurement decision-making model
Illustration 4
Make-or-Buy Analysis
16 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 43 and p.44). The results from Health Case #1 and #2 are not consistent with the PC Recommendation #12.4 on the need to trial the early 
contractor involvement model. Indeed, there seems to be some tension between this recommendation and the PC Recommendations #12.1 and #12.5 concerning government 
investing more time and resources (including concept designs using Building Information Modelling) in the initial concept design specifications that allow contestability not just in 
price but also in design. 
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Procedure in new (first-order) procurement decision-making model
Stage 1 Initial activity analysis
The model prompts the user to first break down the project 
into key economic activities. That is, the user is prompted 
to identify key non-trivial production (design, construction, 
operation and maintenance) activities with distinct 
technology or knowledge/skill sets; i.e., activities that are 
of significant cost relative to the cost of the project. As a 
guide, the highest level of specialisation in the market is 
used to identify key activity or market firms whose cluster 
of goods/services include the activity concerned. Across 
the project, the scope of each activity is located and 
grouped.
Stage 1 Make-or-buy analysis
Each key activity is then assessed in terms of whether 
government or the market has superior capability or 
competence with respect to the activity, and whether there 
is the potential for hold-up arising from the activity. These 
questions are derived from two Nobel Prize-winning 
transaction cost theories and Resource-Based Theory (the 
dominant theory pertaining to make-or-buy analysis from 
the field of strategic management), and are designed as 
objective questions to give objective and reliable answers 
in pursuance of transparency (both government and 
industry could run the model independently). 
Having answered the set of questions relating to each 
activity, an empirical pattern is generated. This pattern is 
matched with the closest theoretical pattern in the table 
below (that reflects a novel integration of the three theories) 
to indicate whether the activity is internalised or procured 
as part of a network (internalised and/or externalised) or 
externalised as part of the project, based on the economic 
rationale associated with the pattern.
Pattern Logic Make-or-Buy 
Pattern 1 Production and/or Organisational Capability Internal
Pattern 2 Production Competence Internal or Network
Pattern 3 Organisational Competence Internal or Network
Pattern 4 Hold-up / Transactional Competence Internal
Pattern 5 Hold-up / Transactional Competence External 
Pattern 6 Organisational Competence External 
Pattern 7 Production Competence External 
Pattern 8 Production and/or Organisational Capability External 
Illustration 5
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Stage 1 Supporting market analysis
A brief secondary data analysis of the market structure 
surrounding each activity assigned to one of the four 
patterns concerning externalisation, is undertaken (5; 6; 7; 
and 8). These patterns correspond with particular market 
structures, from perfect competition with a high level of price 
competition (Pattern 6), to market structures with much less 
price competition, such as oligopoly/duopoly/monopoly 
(Pattern 8). Hence, this analysis provides a check against 
the initial patterns arising from the previous analysis. 
The model then prompts the user to consider any Pattern 
8 activities arising out of the scale of the activity’s work in 
the project, and guides the user to break down the activity 
concerned into two or more sub-activities. This is in order to 
avoid a lack of competition created by an unduly powerful 
market firm (e.g., a subcontractor) as part of supply chain 
managed by a different upstream market firm (e.g., a main 
contractor). Hence, this analysis possibly iterates back to 
activity analysis, and then to make-or-buy analysis, until any 
Pattern 8 activities arising out of scale have been filtered out 
before moving to the next stage.
Stage 2 Bundling analysis 
In this analysis, the model prompts the user to consider any 
potentially troublesome activities that will lead to government 
becoming vulnerable, and to market firms becoming too 
powerful post-contract; i.e., a Pattern 5 activity (hold-up 
arising out of high asset specificity  
and uncertainty). 
The model also guides the user to consider any residual 
Pattern 8 activities that remain because of rare technology 
(notwithstanding their scale), and which are likely to lead to 
a lack of competition and market power to set prices pre-
contract, and again hold-up problems post-contract. More 
specifically, the model prompts the user to consider:
 » Whether any potential opportunistic behavior by 
market firms associated with these troublesome 
activities can be checked by the firm being engaged 
at the head of the supply chain/contract that includes 
these activities (e.g., a main contractor that is 
coordinating/subcontracting these troublesome 
activities could use the threat of future work to address 
any potential negative opportunistic behaviour).
If this is unlikely, then the model prompts the user to 
consider either: 
 › A special tri-lateral relationship with the firms 
providing these troublesome activities through 
the firm being engaged at the head of the supply 
chain that includes these activities (e.g., use of 
Prime Cost Sum and a nominated subcontractor/
supplier arrangement, which then drops down 
into the next analysis concerning the exchange 
relationship) or
 › A separate contract between the government 
and the market firm providing the troublesome 
activities (i.e., exclude these activities from any 
subsequent bundle).
The model then guides the user to bundle the remaining 
key activities into the main activities of:
 » Design
 » Construction
 » Operations and 
 » Maintenance
Again, the model prompts the user to attempt to break 
down each main activity if its size and/or complexity leads 
to a Pattern 8 activity. 
From here, the user is able to identify any potential major 
activities. That is, bundle(s) of DCO main activities, DCM 
main activities, or DCOM main activities that can be market 
sounded as PPP(s) or otherwise via contract(s). If this 
market sounding is not successful, then the default is: a 
separate D and/or C main activity (with either Construct 
Only or Design and Construct, with the performance 
specification given in whole-life terms); a separate O 
main activity; and a separate M activity organised by 
government (either directly and/or using market firm  
(e.g., Project Management consultant). 
In other words, and in terms of the key mechanism being 
deployed to realise the benefits of the integration of 
Operations and Maintenance with Design and Construction 
in pursuance of increased benefits and lower whole-life 
costs, the model considers that private finance holds the 
greatest high power incentive, followed by contract. If the 
market is not responding positively to the use of these 
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mechanisms, then bureaucracy is used to perform the 
integrating role. The outcome of this stage comprises the 
delineation of multiple bundles of key activities and/or main 
activities, and/or major activities, to form the basis of one 
or more contracts to deliver the project.
Stage 3 Exchange Relationship Analysis
Finally, the model guides the user to consider crafting an 
efficient exchange between the buyer (government) and 
each firm or counterparty in the contract/s identified in 
the previous stage. To do this, the model combines the 
strengths of both TCE and Principal Agent Theory (PAT). 
That is, efficient governance in the exchange seeks to 
pre-empt vulnerability in an exchange, and negative 
opportunistic behaviour or hold-up – in this case, by the 
supplier. At the same time, it seeks to encourage positive 
behaviour through incentives that help align the interests 
of the principal (in this case, government) and the agent 
(in this case, the counterparty in each contract). In this 
way, both approaches reduce external transaction costs; 
that is, hold-up costs, as well as monitoring and shirking 
costs. Additionally, PAT concerns the development of an 
exchange that increases benefits beyond reducing costs.
In the first step in this stage, TCE is deployed by the 
model by prompting the user to answer a set of questions 
about each contract. Again, this generates a pattern that 
broadly steers the exchange in each contract towards an 
arms-length exchange (that is, a discrete exchange) or a 
relational exchange, as shown below.
+++    Relational    +
TCE
Asset specificity +/+++ 
Uncertainty +/+++
Frequency       +/0
0       0 
0  +++ 
+/0       0
+  +++ 
+  +++ 
+/0       0
+    Discrete    +++ +    Extremely Discrete    +++
External 
Exchange
1
a
2
b
3
c
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On the continuum between relational exchange and discrete exchange, the model then prompts the user to make 
connections with three broad categories of contract expressed in PAT terms, as shown below.
The solid part of the line in the external exchange figure 
in this stage can be connected to contracts that are 
somewhere between Hybrid contracts (to the left of the 
solid line) and outcome-based contracts (to the right of the 
solid line). The further the contract has been located to the 
right of the solid line, the more it incorporates information 
asymmetry and favours the supplier (in terms of the lack of 
knowledge the government 
has to bring to the exchange collaboration) and, therefore, 
the greater the power held by the supplier. Thus, a greater 
level of credible threat is necessary to pre-empt hold-up. 
At the same time, however, such threats are costly to write 
and are priced by the supplier. Nonetheless, this is, overall, 
the most efficacious approach to governance in terms of 
addressing the risk in the exchange.
Behaviour-based
Hybrid  
(Outcome-based and Behaviour-based)
Outcome-based
 » Cost-plus
 » Low power incentive
 » Principal’s risk to completion
 » Agency cost
 › specifying behaviour
 › monitoring behaviour
 › outcome uncertainty
 › very complex project
 › less goal alignment
 » Target outturn costs/guaranteed 
construction sum linked with gain share/pain 
share regime
 » Risks balanced between agent and principal
 » Suitable for outcome uncertainty
 » Fixed-price
 » High power incentive
 » Agent’s risk to completion
 » Agency costs
 › specifying outcomes
 › verifying outcomes
 › risk premium
 › suitable for information asymmetry 
 › outcome certainty
 › better goal alignment
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Case Studies
Health Case Studies
The new model identified a PPP approach in Health 
Case #2 and it is considered this would have delivered 
significant improvements in VfM in contrast to the Managing 
Contractor approach actually used. The key lessons learned 
across Health Case Studies #1 and #2 is the potential for 
operational and maintenance efficiency to be delivered 
through the design of high technology services through 
the facility’s Building Management System (BMS). Hence, 
large hospitals with a BMS promote the bundling of DCM or 
DC&OM in terms of operational and maintenance benefits 
and therefore the use of PPPs. The other key lesson from 
the health case studies is the imperative to fully develop 
and specify user requirements in pursuance of minimising 
transaction costs and avoiding costly post-contract 
variations and at same time maximising contestability. 
Hence, these case studies promote the development of 
the articulation of the performance specification mindful 
of long term goals. These cases did not then necessarily 
promote the imperative of early contractor involvement and 
negotiation of the budget for the construction works. These 
cases did promote the involvement of the contractor at the 
stage at which the client agency has developed and defined 
their requirements. Such that a price could be established 
efficiency and in competition with other contractors.
Road Case Studies
The new model developed a multiple contract approach 
to Road Case #2 and again, it is considered this would 
delivered appreciable VfM improvement in contrast to the 
single Alliance contract approach actually used. The key 
lessons learned across Road Case Studies #1 and #2 is the 
potential to separate sections of roads that have different 
levels of uncertainty associated with ground conditions; 
proximity to adjoining existing roads; and third party works 
that may affect the timeline. Because of these factors in 
Road #2, there were sections in this project that were highly 
unpredictable. More precisely, uncertain ground conditions 
in driven tunnel work; complexity of works alongside and 
across existing highways, as well as cut and cover tunnel 
works subject to progress of rail alignment work by others. 
However, around 50% of the remaining sections of Road 
Case #2 was relatively straightforward road on grade and 
elevated structures. In this case, the model confirmed 
the efficiency of treating the procurement of operations 
and maintenance of this new piece of road as part of a 
network approach given economies of scale and learning 
economies; along with marginal cost associated with an 
emergency response. As such, there was no viable DCM or 
DCO or DCOM bundle and the new model then developed 
four contracts, comprising:
Case study Road Case #1 Road Case #2 Health Case #1 Health Case #2
Sector Road Road Health Health
EoI Optimal EoI 
(8 EoI)
Sub-optimal    
(low – 2 EoI) 
Optimal 
(5 EoI)
Sub-optimal  
(high – 15EoI)
Capital value in categories $50-100 million $250-500 million $250-500 million $250-500 million
Actual procurement mode Traditional Construct Only Alliancing Public Private 
Partnership
Managing contractor
Actual payment terms Fixed-price lump sum Guaranteed construction 
sum with pain-share/
gain-share
Fixed monthly payment Target outturn cost with 
pain-share/gain-share
Illustration 6
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 » Contract #1: Design of the driven tunnel including fire 
safety design using a bespoke consultancy agreement 
with credible threats for non-performance;
 » Contract #2: Design of the remaining part of project 
using a standard consultancy agreement;
 » Contract #3: Construction of the tunnels both cut and 
cover and driven tunnel using a bespoke agreement 
including pain share/gain share regime; and
 » Contract #4: Construction of the remaining part of the 
project using a standard construction contract.
The model also noted that subject to competitive bidding, 
Contract #1 and #2 could have been awarded to the same 
consultancy but as separate contracts/agreements and 
similarly subject to competitive bidding, Contract #3 and #4 
could have been awarded to the same contractor but again 
with separate contracts /agreements. As an alternative to 
a separate design Contract #2 and separate construction 
Contract #4, these contracts could have been combined into a 
Design and Construct approach (with whole-life performance 
specifications) again with standard contract. However, the 
extremely specialist nature of design in Contract #1 (a Pattern 8 
activity) indicated that it would be more efficient for government 
to directly engage the consultant concerned to monitor 
progress directly and avoid potential-hold being compounded 
and worsened as part of a Design and Construct approach. 
The model would also have seen the contractor in Contract 
#3 displaying flexibility in the works and timing at the junctions 
of the different sections of road between Contract #3 and 
Contract #4.
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Experiential, theoretical and empirical 
support for the reliability and validity 
of the new (first-order) procurement 
decision-making model justifies 
acceptance of its outcomes including 
improved VfM outcomes for Health 
Case #2 and Road Case #2. In terms 
of experiential support, the new model 
is able to determine the suitability 
or otherwise of PPPs in delivering 
superior VfM by optimising the size of 
the contract/s, the level of bundling, 
and the exchange relationship/s in 
order to ensure sufficient construction 
competition and minimise the likelihood 
of costly post-contract variations.
Achieving optimal competition and 
minimising the risks of costly variations 
is critical in determining the suitability 
of PPPs. For example, the House of 
Lords (2010), while investigating the 
efficacy of PPPs in the UK (which has 
undertaken more PPPs than anywhere 
else in the world) concluded that size 
of contract and predictability of events 
within the PPP long-term contract are 
key drivers in delivering VfM within 
PPPs. However, these two factors can 
also be disadvantageous; therefore, 
the House of Lords recommends that 
PPP projects should not be too large (to 
avoid insufficient competition), and be 
capable of being clearly performance-
specified (to avoid too much uncertainty 
in the long-term contract). In order 
words, market failure pre-contract due 
to a small number of bidders and market 
failure post-contract arising out the 
monopoly supply need to be avoided  
as part of the basis of a suitable  
PPP project.17
In terms of theoretical support, all of 
the theories used in the model are well 
established and empirically tested in 
mainstream economics and management. 
In particular, the integration of the theories 
to develop the questions that establish 
internalisation or externalisation of the 
activity in Stage 1 in the model deploys a 
novel integration of Nobel-prize winning 
economic theory. This novel integration 
has been published in a top-tier 
construction journal (Bridge & Tisdell, 
2004), and is described as “ingenious” 
by Prof Michael Ball of The University of 
Reading (UK). In one of world’s leading 
management journals, it is also cited as 
being part of the work that is leading the 
development of the integration of theory 
of the firm on construction activity (Brahm 
&Tarziján, 2014).18
The approach to establishing the reliability 
and validity of the new model is shown in 
Illustration 7. In terms of reliability (Point 
1 in Illustration 7), the survey of major 
road and health projects shows that a 
statistically significant relationship exists 
between EoI and:
 » Size or project value; 
 » Bundling; and
 » Exchange relationship (payment 
terms).
The representative sample of 87 
projects comprised approximately equal 
numbers of projects before the GFC 
(42 projects) and after the GFC (45 
projects). Given the extreme and rare 
conditions either side of the GFC, this 
provides strong evidence that these 
relationships are highly likely to endure 
in the long term.
Government and 
market capabilities 
and competence
Transaction 
characteristics
Key 
activities
Nobel Prize 
winning 
theories
First-order 
procurement 
decision-
making model
Key Procurement 
Dimensions
Point 1
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2
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Bundling
Procurement 
strategy
VfM
(Starting on 
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toward 
superior 
ratio of 
costs and 
benefits in 
whole-life 
terms)
Avoidance of 
market failure 
(Pre-contract 
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Project 
schematic
Establishing the reliability and validity of the new model
Illustration 7
17 House of Lords. (2010). Private finance projects and off-balance sheet debt: 1st report of Session 2009-10. Select Committee on Economic Affairs.
18 Bridge, A.J. and Tisdell, C. (2004). The determinants of the vertical boundaries of the construction firm. Construction Management and Economics, 22(8), 807-825.; Ball, 
M. 2007. Markets and institutions in real estate and construction. New York; Wiley-Blackwell; Brahm, F. & Tarziján, J. (2014). Transactional hazards, institutional change, and 
capabilities: Integrating the theories of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 35, 224-245.
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In terms of validity, high EoI or the 
equivalent of open tender (over 8) has 
been empirically shown in extensive 
studies in both the civil and building 
sectors to yield little production 
improvement in terms of lower prices 
and inferred incentives for design 
innovations (Gupta, 2002; Skitmore, 
2002). At the same time, high EoI can 
indicate the prospect of market failure 
post-contract, due to potential negative 
opportunistic behaviour as a result of a 
lack of flexibility associated with costly 
variations (Sweeney, 2009; Williamson, 
1985).19 
On the other hand, low EoI (4 or less) is 
not sufficient to avoid oligopoly pricing 
constraints and resultant ineffective 
competition (Beattie, Goodacre, & 
Fearnley, 2003; Selten, 1973). It can 
indicate market failure pre-contract, 
including failure as a result of the 
issue of size.20 For these reasons, 5-8 
(inclusive) EoI is derived as an optimal 
level of potential competition consistent 
with VfM. As such, the hypothesis for 
Objective #1 was stated as follows: 
 » Actual competition is expected 
to be in the optimum range of 
competition (5 to 8 EoI) in cases in 
which actual procurement matches 
the theoretical procurement 
(informed by the first-order 
procurement decision-making 
model) and outside the optimum 
range in cases where there is an 
appreciable mismatch between 
actual procurement and the 
theoretical procurement. 
Illustration 8 summarises the very strong 
support for this hypothesis from the four 
case studies.
The hypothesis is further supported 
by the nationwide survey of civil and 
building contractors, which indicates 
that the approach identified by the new 
model in Health Case #2 was likely to 
have seen a reduced number of EoI 
downwards towards the optimum 5-8 
EoI band. The approach in Road Case 
#2, on the other hand, was likely to 
have seen an increase in EoI upwards 
towards the optimum 5-8 EoI band.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
 » It is recommended that the new 
(first-order) procurement decision-
making model be trialled on a 
current project, and that a practice/
user guide be developed. This 
guide would replace the current 
PPP suitability criteria/drivers and 
Procurement Option Analysis 
(POA) in Infrastructure Australia’s 
National PPP Policy and Framework 
and Guidance materials, and 
in its various state versions 
(further details in section “Future 
Research”).21 
 » On the basis of the survey of 87 major 
road and health projects worth $32 
billion, the new model is expected 
to more than double the chance 
that the procurement approach is 
successful in setting the project on 
a path to deliver superior VfM, and 
in  determining whether this can be 
achieved through a PPP or non-PPP. 
This figure is based on only 43% of 
projects in the sample that achieved 
EoI in the optimal 5-8 band.
 » It is logical to expect that the 
application of the new model will 
see the emergence of different 
approaches and innovations in 
patterns of procurement relating to 
the key procurement dimensions 
of size, bundling and exchange 
relationships. This is mainly because 
the new model is exclusively an 
economic one, with a long-term 
orientation. For example:
Optimal Eol
(8)
Actual procurement and model 
procurement match  
Road Case #R1
Sub-optimal/low Eol
(2)
Actual procurement and model 
procurement mismatch  
Road Case #R2
Sub-optimal/High Eol
(15)
Actual procurement and model 
procurement mismatch  
Health Case #R2
Optimal Eol
(5)
Actual procurement and model 
procurement match  
Health Case #H1
Hypothesis Testing
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19 Gupta, S. (2002). Competition and collusion in a government procurement auction market. Atlantic Economic Journal, 30(1), 13-25; Skitmore, M. (2002). Raftery curve construction 
for tender price forecasts. Construction Management and Economics, 20(1), 83-89; Sweeney, S. (2009). Addressing market failure: Using transaction cost economics to improve the 
construction industry’s performance PhD Thesis. University of Melbourne, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering; and Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions 
of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting. New York, London: Free Press, Collier Macmillan. 
20 Beattie, V., Goodacre, A., & Fearnley, S. (2003). And then there were four: A study of UK audit market concentration — causes, consequences and the scope for market adjustment 
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 11(3), 250-265; and Selten, B. (1973). A simple model of imperfect competition, where 4 are few and 6 are many. International Journal 
of Game Theory, 2(1), 141-201.
21 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p.2 and p. 461): This outcome would address significantly the key point made by in the report that there is scope to improve public sector procurement 
practices. The PC refers to a paper by Teo et al. (2012) on the new (first-order) procurement decision-making model (please see the section on “Publications” in this report).
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 › On the basis of the sectors 
studied, the new model 
is likely to apply a single-
contract approach to projects 
between $1.5 - 2 billion. 
Beyond this range, the model 
is likely to identify innovations 
using a multiple-contract 
approach to the project 
delivery. For example, in 
Road Case #2, a multiple 
contract approach would 
deliver both collaboration and 
more contestability. It is also 
conceivable that a multiple-
contract approach can include 
more than one PPP contract in 
a project.22
 › The new model is likely 
to suggest increasing 
rationalisation of procurement 
across sectors. It is likely 
to reveal greater scope for 
bundling operations and 
maintenance with design and 
construction in health projects, 
and for the consideration of 
more of these projects as PPPs. 
It is also likely to promote the 
use of PPPs for road projects 
that are very large and complex, 
and where a relatively high 
percentage of total cost are 
operations and maintenance 
costs. The relative efficiency 
gains achieved by procuring 
road maintenance on a  
network basis do create a 
significant hurdle
for the availability payment 
approach to a road that is 
relatively straightforward in its 
maintenance requirements. An 
exception could be a relatively 
straightforward toll road of 
lesser scale than the remaining 
network for which the PPP 
Company assumes the demand 
risk, and absorbs any relative 
inefficiency risks involved in 
delivering maintenance to that 
toll road. To the extent that any 
inefficiency arises, receipts 
retained by the PPP Company 
could offset these inefficiency 
costs. 
 › Increasing rationalisation of 
procurement across sectors 
is also likely to lead to less 
reliance on stereotypical 
procurement that tends to 
create incentives to minimise 
capital costs, and/or minimise 
construction, and to establish 
the budget in collaboration 
with the supplier. For example, 
this rationalisation might 
be achieved through less 
Managing Contractor and Early 
Contractor Involvement. The 
new model is likely to display 
more finesse in deploying 
Alliancing so that this mode is 
only employed with regard to 
the new infrastructure project/
parts of the new project if/when 
it can be efficient.23
 » The model is likely to guide these 
changes through cost improvements 
and benefits derived from allowing 
more time for planning and design 
development, and for the 
development of performance 
specifications to ensure that 
contestability is achieved and that the 
market is allowed to work as efficiently 
as possible.24
 » Finally, the new model will also:
 › Save time and costs to both 
government and industry by 
more reliably identifying the most 
suitable projects to be procured 
using a PPP approach, and by 
ensuring that the extra-over work 
involved in a PPP – including 
PPP procedure beyond 
performance specification and 
reference design up to financial 
close – is justified.25
 › Provide a transparent and public 
interest document that can be 
fully disclosed mainly because 
the assessment in the model 
is semi-qualitative. That is, the 
questions in the model are 
designed to objectively capture 
known details concerning 
the market and project in a 
reliable fashion on the answer/
response scales (that are 
largely not monetised except 
in some instances in which 
broad monetary catogories are 
used). As such, the model can 
supplement the Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC) in projects 
in which parts of the PSC are 
not published due to comercial-
in-confidence concerns. It can 
also entirely replace the PSC 
in terms of what is published 
as justification for a PPP 
approach.26
22 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 30 and p. 45). This research sees government as having substantial countervailing power and the new model identifies the most efficient 
threshold to sub-divide the project in multiple contracts. As such, this research supports the PC’s Recommendation #12.8 and mention of developing smart procurement 
strategies including packaging major projects into smaller parts to increase the number of bidders and project scheduling and mindful of the PC’s note that it sees some 
uncertainty remaining on whether the concentrated structure of the market appears to inhibit competition and increase construction costs.
23 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 122). This research is consistent with the PC’s comments concerning Alliances and in particular this research cautions against its blanket use 
across an entire project and the new model would determine if/which parts of the project might be best delivered in alliance mode.
24 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 43). This implication of the new model supports the Recommendation #12.1 concerning investing more time and resources in the initial 
concept decision specifications and more generally that governments should not rush to market.
25 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 13). The expected outcomes of the model would be consistent with the PC’s comment that PPPs “are not a magic pudding” and the new 
model would identify the best suited PPP only. 
26 PC Inquiry Report (March, 2014, p. 36 and p. 137). A further outcome of the model that speaks to the need for reform mentioned by the PC concerns facilitating the 
development of greater procurement competencies though the understating and deployment of the procedures in the new model. Finally, the new model would complement 
the PSC and help mitigate some of the concerns the PC mentions concerning the problematic nature of developing the PSC. That is, the new model would provide a check and 
balance to the PSC and details arising from the deployment of the new model are able to be fully disclosed.
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Objective #2 The determinants 
of multinational contractors’ 
willingness to bid for Australian 
public sector major infrastructure 
projects
BACKGROUND
One of the premises for this research was 
the need expressed by government to 
attract the world’s biggest construction 
companies to Australia in order to cut the 
costs of building infrastructure. Illustration 9 
shows that the world’s largest multinational 
contractors headquartered in China, 
Japan, Spain and USA (which collectively 
account for more than half of the world’s 
largest contractors) have no or very little 
representation in bids for new public sector 
major road, bridges and tunnels in Australia 
through the National Prequalification 
System (NPS). 
This situation is puzzling as 
comprehensive research shows that 
multinationals, including those from 
China and Japan, tend to focus and 
expand first in their own region and 
then globally (Yin & Choi 2005; Delios & 
Beamish, 2005).27  Thus, public sector 
major roads, bridges and tunnels in 
Australia seem to be an unusual case 
in terms of multinational enterprise and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
limited presence of the world’s largest 
contractors in this sector has existed 
for some time and been a concern to 
government as a factor that contributes 
to high construction costs in Australia 
(Infrastructure Australia, 2011; Hepworth, 
2010; and Cameron, 2008).28  According 
to the Structure-Conduct model, which 
describes the power to set prices 
associated with monopoly/duopoly 
and oligopoly pricing constraints, 
governments may have grounds to 
be concerned about the relationship 
between small numbers of large or Tier 1 
contractors in the NPS and the costs of 
major roads, bridge and tunnels projects 
in Australia.
This research does not seek to address 
directly the relationship between limited 
involvement by multinationals and 
prices. Rather, it aims to understand the 
key factors that explain multinationals’ 
perceptions of the focal sector (public 
sector major roads, bridges and 
tunnels) and the way this affects their 
willingness to bid for new projects in this 
sector. Indirectly, this research speaks 
to costs of construction, but only in 
so far as perceptions held by foreign 
multinationals of the level of prices in the 
focal sector may affect how much they 
are attracted to this sector. Identifying 
these key factors will enable government 
and regulatory authorities in Australia to 
undertake a new approach and develop 
more effective measures to attract more 
multinational contractors, including 
from our region, if it is felt that more 
competition is in the public interest. If so, 
the outcomes of the research can inform 
government and regulatory authorities 
in deciding where to focus their efforts 
and reform, and whether this includes 
a focus on upstream impact on costs of 
doing business in this sector in Australia, 
in so far these costs are affected 
by government and the institutional 
environment in Australia.
World’s largest multinational contractors and Australia’s National  
Pre-qualification System (NPS)
# Country 
No of firms (transportation industry revenue is greater than  
USD 1 billion) 
1 China 9
2 Japan 6
3 Spain 6 (2  are listed  as prequalified  road, bridge contractor in 
Australia’s NPS, 2012)
4 US 4 (1 was listed in Australia’s NPS, 2010)
  Sub-Total (1-4) 25 (around 60% of top 50 global civil contractors)
5 France 3
6 Austria 2
7 Brazil 2
8 Germany 2
9 Greece 2
10 Italy 2 (among these 1 listed in Australia’s NPS, 2012)
11 Korea 2
12 UK 2
13 India 1
14 Luxemburg 1
15 Netherland 1
16 Sweden 1
 Total no. of countries 46
Illustration 9
27 Yin, E., & Choi, C. J. (2005). The globalization myth: The case of China. MIR: Management International Review, 103-120; and Delios, A., & Beamish, P. W. (2005). Regional and 
global strategies of Japanese firms. Management International Review, 19-36. 
28 Infrastructure Australia. (2011). Communicating the imperative for action. A report to the Australian Government. Retrieved from Australian Government Infrastructure Australia 
website www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au /2011_coag/files/2011_Report_to_COAG.pdf; Hepworth, A. (2010). Costs threaten to stymie infrastructure projects. Australian Financial 
Review. Retrieved from http://global.factiva.com.ezp01.library.qut. edu.au/ha/default. aspx; and Cameron (2008). High bidding costs – not competition – blamed for building 
woes. Australian. April 18. 
 < 25
A NEW APPROACH 
FDI forms the fundamental context for this 
research. Dunning’s “OLI” theory is the 
dominant theory for explaining FDI, which 
is at the core of multinational enterprise 
and international business (Dunning, 
1973; Dunning & Lundan 2008a; 2008b).29 
Here, the “O” represents resources and 
sources of competitive advantages 
owned by the firm (or Why multinational 
contracting); “L” depicts perceptions of 
costs and returns derived as a function of 
the home and host locations across which 
multinational enterprise is conducted (or 
Where multinational contracting); and “I’ 
represents the decision the multinational 
firm makes to either export, licence or 
set-up business in the host country (or 
How multinational contracting). Despite 
the dominance of OLI theory, only six 
empirical studies (between 1987 and 
2006) have attempted to deploy OLI 
theory to explain multinational contracting. 
All of these have investigated outbound 
FDI and none have concerned Australia. 
Moreover, these studies have not used 
the economic theories advocated by 
Dunning in measuring the OLI factors and 
have not fully accounted for the unique 
characteristics of construction, including 
location-specific matters associated with 
clients, local procedures and practices, 
and local supply chains, mainly because 
these studies have all been outbound 
studies and not fixed the host location. 
In contrast, this research deploys the 
economic theories recommended by 
Dunning, and is an inbound FDI study  
that fixes the host location (Australia) 
and a number of home countries (China, 
Japan, Spain, and US) with regard to FDI 
into the focal sector in Australia. In this 
sense, the study is a new approach and 
a world first in developing Dunning’s OLI 
theory to explain multinational contracting, 
including the unique characteristics of 
construction activity.
The approach taken in the research was 
to translate the OLI factors into three key 
moves for the multinational contractor as 
shown in Illustration 10.
In order to measure the effect of each 
factor in each key move on bidding for 
a new project, a wide range of primary 
data from seven local contractors and 
nine of the world’s largest multinational 
contractors, along with secondary data 
was collected.
The generalisability of the findings was 
achieved by choosing a multiple case 
study method that represents strong 
analytical generalisation (theoretical  
and literal replication) as shown in 
Illustration 11.
The selection of the cases first focused on 
FDI, and identified two pairs of contrasting 
countries from the four countries 
representing the greatest proportion of 
multinational contractors across the globe. 
Spain and the US was selected as one 
pair, with a known relatively high level 
of FDI into the Australian road, bridge 
and tunnel sector (across both public 
and private sectors, including mining); in 
contrast, Japan and China was selected 
as an opposing pair, with much less FDI 
in roads, bridges and tunnels in Australia 
(in terms of separate bidding entities). A 
further dimension of contrast in these pairs 
is their geographical contrast. The actual 
Tier 1 multinational contractors studied to 
represent each home country, as well as 
host country contractors studied, were all 
selected at random.
Home
Key Move #1
O (Resources)
Key Move #2
L (Locations)
Key Move #3:
I (Supply Chain &  
 entry mode)
Host
Theory on multinational contracting
Illustration 10
(Spain, Japan, US, China) (Australia)
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Theoretical replication
Spain 
1
2
U.S. China
Japan
Case
OR: 1A 
Case
OR: 2A 
Case
IR: 4A 
Case
IR: 3A 
Case
OR: 1B 
Case
OR: 2B 
Case
IR: 4B 
Case
IR: 3B 
Case
IR: 3C 
Case study design for generalisability
Illustration 11
Outside Region (OR) Inside Region (IR)
29 Dunning, J. H. (1973). The determinants of international production. Oxford Economic Papers, 25(3), 289-336; Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. (2008a). Institutions and the OLI 
paradigm of the multinational enterprise. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 25(4), 573-593; and Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. (2008b). Multinational enterprises and the global 
economy (2nd ed.). London: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
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The “O” factor
The “O” factor represents the Why 
in multinational enterprise. It mainly 
describes tangible assets owned by 
the multinational contractor that are not 
appreciably affected (neither enhanced 
nor diminished) by the location of the 
host country. As such, various systems 
across environmental management, 
community management, quality 
management, and health and safety 
management are excluded in the 
analysis of this factor and incorporated 
into the analysis of the “L” factor. That 
is, high standards in these systems in a 
home country could be a disadvantage 
in a host country with low standards, 
and vice versa.
A range of key resources was identified 
from the NPS, and an extensive analysis 
of multinational contractors’ websites 
was undertaken. A standardised scale 
was derived from answers given by 
the three tiers of local contractors to 
questions concerning key resources, 
and was analysed by the use of radar-
type mapping. This was then used to 
compare the answers from the nine case 
study Tier 1 multinational contractors 
from China, Spain, Japan and US. 
In brief, the home contractors were 
essentially self-assessing/estimating 
advantages on some resources and, at 
same time, the local contractors (largely 
the Tier-1 local contractors) were self-
assessing/estimating advantages on 
some of the other resources. 
The important point in the context of this 
research is not that these comparisons 
indicate the superiority of home over 
host contractors, or vice versa. Rather, 
this finding supports the view that the 
home contractors consider that they 
are more capable than Tier 2 and Tier 
3 local contractors in the focal sector in 
the host market on projects exceeding 
$50 million and as well being at least as 
competitive (both resource advantages 
and disadvantages) with Tier 1 local 
contractors in projects exceeding $150 
million, again in the focal sector in 
the host market. Hence, it was found 
that it is not the “O” factor/perceptions 
of relative capability that is the key 
determinant of these home contractors’ 
willingness to bid for project in the focal 
sector in Australia.
In addition to this primary data, a 
wide range of secondary data was 
analysed to assess how much it 
corroborates this finding on the “O” 
factor. Secondary data comprised: 
1) industry-related publications 
concerning firm-specific advantages 
lying directly behind the scores on 
the resources in the radar maps; 
and 2) data from Business Monitor 
International, Euromoney Country Risk, 
the OECD’s Country Statistical Profile, 
and the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report. These 
data were used to construct a Porter’s 
diamond model for each of the four 
home countries and to assess country-
specific advantages that underpin firm-
specific advantage. It was found that 
both these layers of the secondary data 
strongly corroborate the primary data on 
the “O” factor.
The “L” factor
The “L” depicts the Where in 
multinational enterprise. A favourable 
foreign location is required by the 
multinational contractor in order to 
successfully mobilise the tangible 
assets represented by “O” factor 
resources. There are two key dimensions 
that combine to explain a favourable 
location: risk and return. Risk is 
assumed in relation to all competing 
host countries; return is considered in 
relation to all competing host countries 
and is also mindful of returns in the 
home country. Risk is affected by 
the level of congruence or cultural 
distance between the institutional 
environment of the home and host 
countries, given that firms represent 
an imprint of their country in terms 
of management decision-taking, 
attitudes and behavioural norms. This is 
particularly manifest in systems across 
environmental management, community 
management, quality management, and 
health and safety management.
The greater the cultural distance, 
the greater the requirement for the 
multinational contractor to make 
location-specific investments or 
adaption costs, and vice versa. Co-
joined with initial set-up costs, the costs 
of doing business and delivering new 
projects in the host country are affected 
by the host country’s institutional 
environment, procurement policies 
and practices, and project compliance 
requirements. Collectively, set-up and 
delivery/compliance costs are manifest 
in a range of transaction-related 
requirements and systems across 
environmental management, community 
management, quality management, 
and health and safety management; 
in the other words, administrative 
distance. Costs arising from cultural 
and administrative distance and their 
risks are then compounded by spatial/
geographic distance and economic 
distance and uncertainties, including 
trade across borders. Finally, the 
perception of the overall magnitude 
of costs is moderated by the extent to 
which there is confidence in a pipeline 
of projects that might justify these 
set-up and delivery/compliance costs, 
along with confidence in the tendering 
process.
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Risk is only one side of the coin. To 
complete the picture of a favourable 
perception of a foreign location, requires 
consideration of industry sector returns/
profits (based on the structure-conduct-
performance of the focal sector in the 
host location) and assessment of future 
economic threats to profits in the focal 
sector in the host location. 
As is the case with the “O” factor, a mix 
of primary data (from the international 
case studies) and secondary data 
was used to assess the “L” factor. In 
terms of risk, Illustration 12 gives a 
summary of the cultural, administrative, 
geographic (adjusted from a study 
of the multinationals that had already 
established a presence in Australia) and 
economic distances, and the uncertainty 
developed, with reference to a range of 
secondary data and models (including 
Hofstede’s cultural model; the Corruption 
Perception Index; Euromonitor 
International; Transparency International; 
World Bank; IBIS World Australia; 
Euromonitor Country Ratings). 
Primary data from the case studies was 
used to establish the frequency element 
in the risk dimension. The Spanish 
contractors felt they should have a good 
chance of winning new contracts, as 
did the US; however, both Japanese 
and Chinese multinationals studied 
felt that due to client processes, they 
had less chance. Some contractors 
also expressed concern about barriers 
to entry arising from the process of 
tendering, in particular the Australian 
Government Building Construction OHS 
Accreditation Scheme, and the reliability 
of published pipelines.30
Primary data on administration barriers 
to entry into Australia showed a strong 
association between these barriers 
and culture, and demonstrated the 
range of transaction costs generated 
by the institutional environment and 
procurement policy and practice 
in Australia, as shown in Illustration 
13. This finding on transaction costs 
corroborates the secondary data on the 
administrative distance element data 
(see “Admin” in the second column, 
Illustration 12).31
Illustration 14 summarises primary data 
on the perceptions of risk in Australia 
compared with other developed 
countries and developing countries.
L factor: Risk elements (secondary data)
Home 
Country  
Risks based on home-host (Australia) induced distances
Culture Admin Geography Economy Uncertainty 
Spain Low Mod Low (adj.) Low Moderate 
US Low Low Low (adj.) High Moderate 
Japan Mod-High Mod-High Low Mod Moderate
China High High Low High Moderate 
Illustration 12
30 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 27). The PC indicated the potential of shortlisting to select a contractor that does not give best VfM in terms of the way tenderers are shortlisted 
(and their number) and that it is important that shortlisting does not focus excessively on local experience. The views from some of the multinational contractors support at least 
the intent in PC Recommendation #15.1 concerning changes to the Australian Government Building and Construction OHS Accreditation Scheme.
31 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p.26). This data (Item g in Illustration 13) supports the PC comment that bidding costs are high and more generally that Australia’s transaction 
costs are high. 
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Legend: Scale 1 to 7; where
1 represents extremely high effect on entry
2 represents very high effect on entry
3 represents high effect on entry
4 represents moderate effect on entry
5 represents low effect on entry
6 represents very low effect on entry
7 represents extremely low effect on entry
Illustration 13
L factor: Administrative element (primary data)
Administrative distance
Analysed average scores (entry)
Mean
Spain US Japan China
a. Australia’s National Prequalification 
System
2 5 5 1 3.25
b. Level of complexity in 
administration of projects
3 5 2 1 2.75
c. Level of legislation 4 4 4 1 3.25
d. Difference across different state 
jurisdictions in Australia
5 5 3 1 3.5
e. Australia’s industrial relations 4 2 1 1 2
f. Australia’s taxation system 7 3 3 1 3.5
g. Expectations of Australian 
government sector client
4 4 3 1 3
h. Risk allocation in complex road and 
bridge projects
6 5 2 2 3.75
i. Lack of large/comparable local 
contractors to partner with a new 
foreign entrant
4 4 3 5 4
j. Lack of subcontractors 5 4 2 3 3.5
k. Environmental management 
requirements
6 5 6 1 4.5
l. Community management 
requirements
6 4 3 1 3.5
m. Quality management requirements 6 6 7 1 5
n. Health and safety requirements 4 3 7 1 3.75
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To examine perceptions of return, 
Porter’s Five Forces model (level 
of internal rivalry, barriers to entry, 
substitutes and complements, buyer 
power, and supplier power) was 
deployed, using both primary data 
and secondary data (sourced largely 
from industry-related publications) to 
assess threats to profits in both the 
home countries and in Australia. In 
general, both the Spanish and US 
contractors perceived moderate to high 
threats to profits in their home market, 
but low to moderate threats to profits 
in Australia. Conversely, Japanese and 
Chinese contractors perceived low 
threats to profit in their home country, 
and moderate to high threats to profits 
in Australia (with client/buyer power 
featuring as a strong threat to profits). 
This finding was again supported by 
secondary data. 
Illustration 15 summarises primary data 
on the perceptions of returns in Australia 
compared with other developed 
countries and developing countries.
As mentioned previously, the “L” 
factor is the function of risk and return. 
Illustration 16 summarises primary data 
on perceptions of the relative size of risk 
and return in Australia, again compared 
with other developed countries and 
developing countries.
L factor: Summary of risk (primary data)
Home country Risk in Australia  
Spain vs Developed Countries:  Moderate 
vs Developing Countries: Moderate 
US vs Developed Countries:  Moderate 
vs Developing Countries: Low 
Japan vs Developed Countries: High 
vs Developing Countries: Extremely High 
China vs Developed Countries: High 
vs Developing Countries: Extremely High 
Illustration 14
L factor: Summary of return (primary data)
Home country Return in Australia 
Spain vs Developed Countries:  Extremely High 
vs Developing Countries: Very High
US vs Developed Countries:  Very High 
vs Developing Countries:  Very High 
Japan vs Developed Countries:  Low 
vs Developing Countries:  Low 
China vs Developed Countries:  Moderate 
vs Developing Countries:  Very Low 
Illustration 15
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The “I” factor
The “I” factor depicts the How in 
multinational enterprise. All nine 
multinational-contractor case studies 
confirmed emphatically that export 
or licensing of their core service was 
impractical, given that location-specific 
considerations – and, therefore, a 
physical presence and FDI – are required 
to bid for a new project in a foreign 
location. All case study contractors 
advised, to varying degrees, that local 
subcontractors and suppliers need to be 
harnessed in order to win contracts and 
deliver projects profitability.
Illustration 17 summarises the primary 
data on perceptions of the local supply 
chain and whether it is considered as 
an advantage or a disadvantage. This 
data was again interesting, as only the 
US case study contractors saw their 
mobilisation of the local supply chain as 
an advantage. Thus, it was found that the 
“I” factor/perceptions of the local supply 
chain is not the key determinant of the 
home contractors’ willingness to bid for 
projects in the focal sector in Australia.
Illustration 18 matches the results of the 
assessment of the OLI factors to primary 
data on Australia’s attractiveness to 
each of the multinational contractors, 
compared with the attractiveness of  
other developed countries and 
developing countries. 
L factor: Summary of risk and return (primary data)
Case Study 
Multinational 
Contractors
Return vs. Risk in 
Australia relative to 
developed countries  
Return vs. Risk in 
Australia relative 
to developing 
countries
L Factor
Spain (Case 1A) Return > Risk Return > Risk Favourable 
Spain (Case 1B) Return > Risk Return > Risk Favourable 
US (Case 2A) Return > Risk Return > Risk Favourable 
US  (Case 2B) Return > Risk Return > Risk Favourable 
Japan (Case 3A) Return < Risk Return < Risk Unfavourable 
Japan (Case 3B) Return < Risk Return < Risk Unfavourable 
Japan (Case 3C) Return < Risk Return < Risk Unfavourable 
China (Case 4A) Return = Risk Return < Risk Unfavourable 
China (Case 4B) Return = Risk Return < Risk Unfavourable 
Illustration 16
I factor: Summary (primary data)
Home country 
I Factor
Australia relative to developed 
countries   
I Factor 
Australia relative to developing 
countries 
Spain Disadvantage Disadvantage 
US High advantage  Advantage  
Japan Disadvantage High disadvantage 
China Moderate Extreme disadvantage 
Illustration 17
Illustration 18
Summary results
Home country O Factor 
(Resources)
L Factor 
(Location)
I Factor 
(Supply Chain)
Australia vs. 
Developed 
Countries
Australia vs. 
Developing 
Countries
‘Why’ ‘Where’ ‘How’ Attractiveness Attractiveness
Spain Advantages & 
Disadvantages
Favourable Disadvantage Very Attractive
Very 
Attractive
US Advantages & 
Disadvantages
Favourable Advantage Very Attractive 
Very 
Attractive
Japan Advantages & 
Disadvantages
Unfavourable Disadvantage Unattractive
Very 
Unattractive 
China Advantages & 
Disadvantages
Unfavourable Disadvantage Neutral
Extremely 
Unattractive
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The summary in Illustration 18 shows 
that the only factor that matches 
perceptions of attractiveness is the 
“L” factor. The “O” factor mismatches 
attractiveness in the Japanese and 
Chinese cases, and the “I” factor 
mismatches in the case of Spain.
In total, the extensive data in this 
research establishes very clearly that 
the attractiveness of the focal sector 
is explained neither by perceptions of 
differences in capability of home country 
and local contractors, nor by the local 
behaviour of rivals and the supply 
chain in the local market. The strong 
message from this research is, therefore, 
that the Location (“L”) factor is the key 
determinant of attractiveness, which is 
expressed in terms of perceptions of risk 
and return.
More fundamentally, although this 
research does not seek to address 
directly the relationship between the 
current market conditions and possibly 
high prices in the sector, the structure-
conduct-performance of the local market 
is creating perceptions of reletively high 
returns, at least for the Spanish and 
US contractors studied and, therefore, 
contributing to attracting these firms. 
On the other hand, the Japanese and 
Chinese multinational contractors 
studied see returns as unfavourable and 
outweighed by risk. 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 » Illustration 13 shows that the 
local market (items i and j) only 
represents a moderate barrier 
to entry. Instead, the majority of 
relevant items and the key area for 
reform lies within the realm of the 
governance of projects, including 
procurement procedures and some 
institutional and federal-level issues.32
 » Clear differences in perceptions of 
the focal sector in Australia arise 
between countries of different 
cultures, as demonstrated by the 
columns in Illustration 13. These 
columns show a much greater 
incidence of darkest spots in Japan’s 
column and in all items in China’s 
column, with the exception of two 
items concerning local contractors 
and subcontractors.33
 » On the basis that government 
considers that a thin local market is 
contributing to high prices, and that it 
is in the public interest to attract new 
entrants and more competition, it is 
recommended that items a through 
h, and k through n in Illustration 13 
are the subject of investigation, with 
a view to reform. Attention would 
also need to be paid to increasing 
confidence in published pipelines. 
 » If government wishes to attract 
and sustain new entrants from our 
region (including Japan and China) 
to the NPS, these reform efforts 
would need to be intensified in 
conjunction with reforms to improve 
perceptions of return, without 
necessarily increasing prices. For 
example, government could explore 
ways to ensure that any perceptions 
of bias (albeit subconscious and 
inadvertent) are avoided, and look 
at ways of avoiding perceptions that 
governments are a threat to profits. 
For example, Livesey & Bold, 
(2013)  suggest a number of steps 
including changes to the EoI criteria 
and equal exposure to potential 
international and local bidders and 
structuring the project team with 
broad international experience.34
32 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p.2). This outcome speaks to the PC comment on the “workably competitive” nature of the market. The evidence in this research is that the market 
could be appreciably improved and opened-up further to new entrants subject to actions by government on procurement; tendering policy and practice and governance of 
projects. 
33 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p.30 and p.428). Again, this outcome speaks to the PC comment on low-level barriers to new firms entering the market. The evidence in this 
research is that barriers arising from economies of scale are not the significant issue (the “O” factor results shows that multinational contractors have capabilities arising from scale 
elsewhere) and is consistent with the PC’s comment on many international firms with significantly larger balance sheets than the major Australian firms. This research supports 
the PC’s indication that barriers arise from transaction costs including government regulation. More than this, however, this research observes significant barriers arising from the 
administrative items in illustration 13 (items a through h, and k through n) along with a lack of confidence in pipelines and concerns on the part of government in the process of 
tendering. 
34 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p.433): The PC’s comments that “agencies often face incentives to take risk-averse approaches to contract selection and project delivery, which 
may favour the main players with established track record and relationship with the agency”. Livesey, P. and Bold, J. (2013). Overcoming inadvertent barriers to entry in large 
infrastructure projects, Australian Journal of Construction Economics and Building.
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CONNECTING OUTCOMES 
FROM OBJECTIVE #1 AND 
OBJECTIVE #2 
In relation to approaching mega projects, 
there is an important connection between 
Objective #1 and Objective #2 outcomes. 
One approach is via a single contract 
for mega projects, an approach that 
speculates on the possibility of attracting 
new entrants. However, this approach 
could have a number of disadvantages, 
including insufficient expressions of 
interest, oligopoly pricing constraints, 
interrelated consortia, short-term or 
project-specific new entrants in a 
consortium, and the need for government 
concessions to mitigate perceptions 
of risk and improve perceptions of 
return. All of these outcomes would be 
worsened if a number of mega projects 
are brought to market at around same 
time. This single-contract approach 
is also more likely to generate a win-
lose outcome: that is, local contractors 
winning at the cost of undermining long-
term prospects for new entrants, or vice 
versa. 
A different approach is to use the new 
procurement decision-making model 
developed in Objective #1 for mega 
projects. This model could identify 
multiple contracts. Indeed, Illustration 
19 shows that without new entrants 
and changes to the prevailing market 
structure in (at least) roads and health, 
the new procurement decision-making 
model is likely to divide a project that 
exceeds the range of $1.5 billion 
to $2billion into multiple contracts. 
However, this range is likely to be 
restricted to projects that are genuinely 
technologically complex and/or present 
proximity constraints; for example a 
lengthy tunnel. Again, based on the 
evidence in Illustration 19, the more usual 
upper range for major projects delivered 
as a single contract would be between 
$500 million and $800 million. Tier 2 and 
Tier 3 local contractors and new entrants 
might well find that the substantial 
majority of projects between $50 million 
and $500 million attractive in terms of a 
lead or head contractor role.
Such a change would create an 
improved pipeline of contracts for local 
contractors and new entrants wishing to 
make Australia a long-term proposition. 
In this way, a win-win scenario would 
be created arising from more and more 
widely distributed contracts to deliver 
mega projects; this would be particularly 
important for PPPs. In time, by widening 
the base of distinct bidding entities and 
increasing construction capacity, the new 
procurement decision-making model in 
Objective #1 is more likely to envisage 
a single contract approach to mega 
projects.35
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35 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 30 and p. 45). This is consistent with the PC’s comments on governments packaging major projects into smaller parts to increase the number of 
potential bidders; and also consistent Recommendation #12.8.
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As another important connection between 
these objectives, the model is likely to 
guide changes to procurement on the 
basis of cost improvements, and benefits 
derived from the availability of more time 
for planning and design development. 
In particular, the model would promote 
the development of performance 
specifications to ensure that contestability 
is achieved, and that the market is allowed 
to work as efficiently as possible in 
providing a fixed price in the interests of 
whole-life VfM. This invaluable groundwork 
before going to the market will reduce 
risks for international contractors and help 
clarify government expectations.
Finance Theme
Objective #3 Risk and return 
behaviour of Australian PPPs 
(bonds and listed equities) and 
the cost of capital in Australian 
listed PPP equities 
The risk and return behaviour 
of Australian PPP bonds
BACKGROUND
The recent introduction of the Basel III 
Accord in the global banking sector means 
that banks must maintain higher levels of 
liquid assets on their balance sheets in the 
future.  As a result of the higher liquidity 
standards, banks are less willing to hold 
medium-term illiquid bank loans to PPPs 
on their balance sheets.  Thus, the global 
banking sector will be a less reliable source 
of debt financing for PPPs in the future. 
One possible future solution for financing 
PPPs is the direct issuance of their own 
bonds in the marketplace. Issuance of 
bonds has been an important source of 
debt financing for a number of Australian 
PPPs over the last decade; however, little 
is known about this source of financing 
and there is a paucity of research on the 
behaviour of Australian PPP bond returns. 
In response to this gap in knowledge, this 
study examined the price behaviour of 
PPPs in the Australian bond market from 
2002 to 2010. This analysis was based on 
publicly available bond issues only.
NEW INSIGHTS
The research design employed a three-
factor bond asset-pricing model, using 
the systematic risk factors of Term, Default 
and Liquidity. Previous studies in the 
US and Australia have demonstrated 
empirical evidence to suggest that these 
three systematic risk factors explain 
the variation of bond returns.  The Term 
premium measures the compensation 
to investors for owning longer maturity 
bonds in comparison to shorter maturity 
bonds. The Default premium measures 
the reward to investors for owning lower 
creditworthy bonds in comparison to 
Australian government bonds, while the 
Liquidity premium measures the additional 
return to investors to compensate them 
for owning illiquid bonds in comparison to 
bonds which can be more easily traded in 
the debt markets.
This study sample was six PPP bonds 
within the UBS Australia Composite Bond 
Index: Civic Nexus, Lane Cove Tunnel 
1, Lane Cove Tunnel 2, Praeco, Royal 
Women’s Hospital Partnership (RWHP), and 
Axiom Education Queensland (AEQ). The 
two major findings of the study are: 1) that 
the Term, Default and Liquidity systematic 
risk factors can explain the variation of 
Australian PPP bond returns (this suggests 
that PPP bonds behave in a similar manner 
to all other securities in the Australia debt 
market); and 2)  that there are no excess 
(or additional) returns to be earned by 
owning or holding Australian PPP bonds. 
Put differently, investors do not earn 
additional returns by owning Australian PPP 
bonds in comparison to owning any other 
kind of bonds in the Australian debt market.
There is a need to better understand the behaviour 
of infrastructure investments so that investors and 
financiers can make informed decisions about 
infrastructure projects of the future.
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PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
 » In a post-Basel III world, where 
regulated banks are required to 
hold additional “capital buffers”, 
PPPs are less likely to be debt 
financed by banks, and are more 
likely to issue their own bonds. This 
research provides new knowledge 
to the public sector, PPPs and 
superannuation fund investors  
on the pricing and behaviour of 
these investments.
The risk and return behaviour of 
Australian-listed PPP equities
BACKGROUND
The commencement of a PPP project 
is characterised by a long gestation 
period, as the construction phase 
of the underlying assets requires a 
considerable amount of time. This study 
examined the time-varying risk of these 
PPPs from the construction phase to 
the operations phase. This knowledge 
is important for investors, including 
superannuation funds, who have an 
interest in understanding the risk 
dynamics of PPPs as they progress from 
the construction phase (greenfield-type 
investments) to the operations phase 
(brownfield-type investments). As per 
Illustration 20, convention suggests that 
the construction phase of a PPP is riskier 
for investors than the operations phase 
for the following reasons:
 » There are no cash inflows in the 
project during the construction 
phase, as no customers can utilise 
the infrastructure; and
 » Cost overruns in the PPP can occur 
in the construction phase, and can 
cause the project to experience 
unexpected cost escalations. 
NEW INSIGHTS
To examine Australian-listed PPP 
equities, data was collected from the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
on all four ASX-listed PPPs, which are 
all toll-road projects: Connecteast, Hills 
Motorways (no longer listed, acquired 
by Transurban), Rivercity Motorways, 
and Transurban. The data sample 
was for the period 1996 to 2010. Case 
studies show a dramatic increase in 
the company-specific (idiosyncratic) 
risk of these investments as the project 
shifts from the construction phase to the 
operations phase, typically as depicted 
in Illustration 21. At this point, there is 
a sudden decrease in the value of the 
underlying assets for a majority of the 
projects. Regardless of whether the 
PPP is owned by the private sector or 
public sector, when actual demand 
statistics do not meet expected demand 
forecasts, PPP owners experience 
dramatic downward revaluations in their 
PPP assets due to lower than expected 
revenues and net free cashflows 36.
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36 PC Inquiry Report (May, 2014, p. 130). The PC include a reference to Bianchi and Drew (sub.33) in relation to patronage (demand) risk for new toll road projects, as potential 
impediment to private sector financing of public infrastructure.
 < 35
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Future PPP infrastructure projects must 
be constructed to deliver genuine 
improvements in economic growth and 
productivity, or the underlying value of 
the project will dramatically decrease.  
This has implications for federal and 
state governments that are commencing 
new infrastructure projects. “Recycling 
capital” by the public sector over a long-
term (10-year) time horizon can only 
be implemented if the underlying PPP 
project delivers on its expected usage or 
demand, in respect of user-pays PPPs. 
If the PPP demand is not realised, the 
owners of the PPP will suffer substantial 
financial losses. This outcome does 
not apply to PPPs receiving availability 
payments from the public sector.
Cost of capital of Australian-
listed PPP equities
BACKGROUND
This study examined the predictive 
performance of various asset-pricing 
models and constant return benchmarks 
on ASX-listed infrastructure and PPP 
returns. Both public sector and private 
sector participants employ asset-pricing 
models to estimate the cost of equity 
of various industries and companies in 
Australia.  The most famous framework 
used to explain the behaviour of the 
cost of equity capital is the seminal 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  
Recent research by Simin (2008) in the 
US shows that asset-pricing models 
are poor predictors of future returns. In 
fact, Simin (2008) finds that a constant 
excess return benchmark model is a 
better predictor of future returns than 
competing asset pricing models. 
NEW INSIGHTS
The study examined the nine variations 
of the most used asset pricing models 
available; that is, both unconditional 
and conditional variants of the CAPM, 
the Fama and French (1992, 1993) 
three-factor model, and the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model.37 The study 
employed Australian industry-, size- and 
value-based portfolio index returns 
from 1991 to 2010, and studied the 
largest 300 ASX-listed firms by market 
capitalisation (including 778 companies) 
in the analysis. These firms were 
allocated into more than twenty industry-
based portfolio indices, including both 
infrastructure and PPP indices.
The findings reveal that a constant return 
of the risk-free rate plus 6% per annum 
is the best predictor of infrastructure and 
PPP one-month returns. This compares 
to a constant return of the risk-free 
rate plus 5% per annum, which is the 
best predictor of all other Australian 
industry returns.  The finding of the 
higher constant fixed excess return 
model for infrastructure and PPPs 
reflects the marginally higher return and 
risk associated with Australian-listed 
infrastructure and PPP investments in 
comparison to broad Australian stocks. 
This empirical evidence in Australia 
supports the recent findings by Simin 
(2008) in the US context. 38
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
 » Asset-pricing models are useful tools 
in explaining the behaviour of ex-post 
(historical) cost of equity in Australian 
publicly listed companies; however, 
they are less effective at predicting 
ex-ante (future) return behaviour.
 » Participants in both public and private 
sectors currently employ various 
methodologies to estimate the cost of 
equity and weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) of new infrastructure 
and PPP projects.  Participants 
should be cognisant of the fact that 
the asset-pricing tools they are using 
to estimate the appropriate cost of 
equity and WACC of a project are 
poor at forecasting expected returns.  
These risks in the predictability of 
future returns are common for both 
the public and private sectors.
Objective #4 Long-term US 
infrastructure returns and 
portfolio selection (from 1927 
to 2010)
BACKGROUND
Superannuation funds have a natural 
interest in infrastructure due to the long-
life characteristics of these investments, 
which match the long-term obligations and 
liabilities of their fund members. One of 
the challenges in better understanding the 
return and risk behaviour of infrastructure 
is the relatively short empirical history 
available on these investments. The 
current understanding of infrastructure 
investments suggests that they exhibit 
low systematic risks, and high company-
specific (idiosyncratic) risks.
NEW INSIGHTS
This study analysed the return and 
risk behaviour of current infrastructure 
index returns in the US by mapping 
these returns to well-known systematic 
risk factors and industry returns.
By employing a five-factor asset-
pricing model, the behaviour of these 
infrastructure indices was mapped 
to construct a monthly time series of 
infrastructure index returns in the US 
from 1927 to 2010 – a period covering 
the Great Depression in the 1930s, 
World War 2, the oil shocks of the 1970s, 
the October 1987 stockmarket crash, 
9/11, and the 2008 GFC.
37 Carhart, M.M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of Finance, 52(1), 57-82; Fama, E.R. & French, K. R. (1992). The cross-section of expected stock 
returns. The Journal of Finance, 47(2), 427-465. Fama, E.R. & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1), 3-56.
38 Simin, T. (2008). The poor predictive performance of asset pricing models. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 43(2), 355-380.
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U.S. Listed Infrastructure-Long Term Measures of Return and Risk
This table presents the long-term behaviour of the MSCI U.S. Infrastructure Index (MUSII), Dow Jones Brookfield Americas Infrastructure Total Return Index 
(DJBAITRI), Macquarie Global Infrastructure North America Total Return Index (MGINATRI), MSCI U.S. Broad Utilities Index (MUSBUI), MSCI U.S. Small Utilities 
Index (MUSSUI), the Fama and French U.S. market raw monthly returns and the U.S. Government 1 month Treasury-Bill monthly returns for the period from 
January 1927 to December 2010. The statistics are calculated from splicing the long-term constructed monthly returns and the short-term empirical monthly 
return data for each respective index.  Panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. Panel B presents the empirical VaR and CVaR 
estimates at the 95% and 99% confidence intervals, respectively.
MUSII DJBAITRI MGINATRI MUSBUI MUSSUI Stocks T-Bills
Panel A: Moments of the distribution
Mean 0.07 1.02 0.99 0.48 0.83 0.92 0.30
Std. Dev. 4.70 5.17 6.16 5.73 4.71 5.47 0.25
Skewness 0.35 -0.05 0.61 0.14 0.24 0.13 1.02
Kurtosis 12.84 9.93 13.60 11.07 11.10 10.38 4.23
Panel B: Empirical Tail Risk Measures
95% VaR -7.26 -7.36 -8.67 -8.11 -6.48 -7.85 0
99% VaR -13.83 -14.22 -16.21 -14.86 -13.04 -14.93 0
95% CVaR -11.20 -11.63 -13.54 -13.23 -10.45 -12.24 0
99% CVaR -17.94 -19.29 -22.58 -21.95 -17.51 -20.05 0
Illustration 22
The findings show: 1) that infrastructure 
returns in the US exhibit low to moderate 
market beta, and a significant risk factor 
to the US utilities industry [These results 
provide empirical evidence to suggest that 
infrastructure investment returns can be 
explained by systematic and industry-risk 
factors, and are less exposed to company-
specific (idiosyncratic) risks]; 2) that US 
infrastructure index returns exhibit similar 
return, volatility and tail-risk characteristics 
to broad US stocks over the long term. Put 
simply, the return and risk characteristics 
of US-listed infrastructure index returns 
are commensurate with broad US stock 
returns, thereby demonstrating that they 
are not a low-risk proposition; and 3) that 
there is evidence of high correlations and 
betas between US-listed infrastructure and 
broad US stocks, showing that this type of 
infrastructure investment is not a distinct 
asset class, but rather, a sub-set of the US 
share market universe. These findings are 
summarised in Illustration 22.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
 » Public sector (governments) and 
private sector (superannuation 
funds and private individuals) 
interested in a broad and diversified 
exposure to infrastructure need to 
recognise that the long-term risks in 
these listed investments are similar 
to those of a diversified holding of 
US stocks.39 
Connecting outcomes from 
Objective #3 and Objective #4
 » Tradeable infrastructure/PPP bonds 
and equities exhibit similar return 
and risk characteristics as other 
listed securities in their respective 
asset classes.
 » The new knowledge from this 
research will assist governments, 
policymakers and investors to make 
better and informed financing and 
investment decisions.
39 This research has been published by Bianchi, R.J., Bornholt, G., Drew, M.E. & Howard, M.F. (2014). Long-term U.S. infrastructure returns 
and portfolio selection, Journal of Banking and Finance 42, 314-325.
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Procurement and 
finance relationship
From a finance perspective, this 
research promotes the use of 
approaches that ensure that all parties 
are acting in the best interests of the 
“collective”. As part of this process, 
there are benefits to long-term 
investors including superannuation 
funds being engaged at an early 
stage of an infrastructure/PPP project. 
These dynamics allow, for example, 
superannuation funds (i.e., one of 
the beneficiaries of the infrastructure/
PPP project over the long term) to 
moderate the interests of the short-term 
participants in the transaction. This 
results in a better alignment of interests 
and, in turn, a more efficient allocation of 
capital and risk in future infrastructure/
PPP projects.
From a procurement viewpoint, 
the new (first-order) procurement 
decision-making model in Objective 
#1 is consistent with the long- term 
objectives in approaches that see the 
Operator having greater influence on 
the design of the facility. That is, the new 
procurement decision-making model 
searches for viable Design, Construct, 
Operate and Maintain bundles as a pre-
requisite of a successful PPP. In turn, it 
identifies the best projects for long-term 
investors including superannuation 
funds to consider, and promotes  
best scope for the Operator to  
influence design. 
The Productivity Commission (2014a, 
p. 250) refer to an “Inverted Bid Model” 
proposed in a submission to the inquiry 
by Industry Super Australia. Though the 
Productivity Commission note that the 
current PPP model may favour banks, 
it considers that there may be merit in 
exploring a further alternative, a “hybrid” 
approach. Whilst both alternatives 
to the current PPP model may widen 
access to long term equity investors, 
both alternatives may not see any 
appreciable increase in the influence 
the Operator has on design and whole-
life costs, along with promoting other 
innovations to enhance the effect of the 
facility on front-line service. In the PPP 
context, the Operator has a key role 
and can potentially greatly contribute 
to VfM. In the Inverted Bid Model, and 
to the extent that the design needs 
to be detailed beyond performance 
specification and before the selection 
of the long-term equity investor to 
mitigate the risk of the bid varying after 
the equity investor is selected, then this 
would reduce the scope for Operator 
to influence the design. Moreover, 
if the tender for construction (and 
perhaps including any residual design) 
is prioritised ahead of the tender for 
operations and maintenance, then this 
overlooks the potential for the Operator 
to improve VfM outcomes. On the 
other hand, the hybrid approach may 
suffer in the same way as the current 
model. That is, in cases where the PPP 
consortium tenders the construction 
and the remaining design development 
as a Design & Construct contract and 
separate to a contract for operations 
and/or maintenance, and does not 
fully involve the Operator in the design 
development. This situation is most 
likely to occur where there is limited 
competition amongst PPP consortia.40
The new (first-order) procurement 
decision-making would identify the 
projects best suited to a PPP and 
notwithstanding the approach to 
delivering the PPP project. Despite, 
however, the contribution by the new 
(first-order) procurement model, the 
eventual VfM outcomes depend on 
the efficacy of the delivery of the 
PPP. There is much scope for further 
empirical research (arising from this 
research project) to examine challenges 
associated with not just widening 
access to long-term investors but also 
facilitating the greater influence of the 
Operator on design (as noted in “Future 
Research”, below). 
As mentioned when connecting 
outcomes between Objective #1 and 
Objective #2, the greater involvement 
of multinational contractors from China 
(with more likely cash reserves), of 
US multinational contractors already 
established in Australia (with cash 
receipts from the mining sector, and 
who may be looking to diversity into 
public sector infrastructure), and of more 
multinational contractors with access 
to finance from Japan, would assist 
accessibility to affordable finance and 
create a stronger appetite for PPPs.
40 Productivity Commission (2014a). Public infrastructure, Inquiry Report. Vol.2 (No. 71 May). Canberra: Australian Government.
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Future research
Procurement theme
 » Further details on the proposed trial 
application of the new (first-order) 
procurement decision-making model:
 › Ideally, the model will be 
trialled during the investment 
decision (business case/
preliminary evaluation) or project 
development phase (both as part 
of a more specific PPP business 
case, or as part of a more 
specific traditional business case 
development).
 › The trial application could replace 
the usual approach, or operate 
alongside it. It is envisaged 
that the latter approach is 
the more realistic, however, 
not least because of the time 
taken to implement the model’s 
procedures under trial conditions 
(that is, longer than the time taken 
for the future application of the 
post-trial refined model).
 › One of the key outcomes of the 
trial application will be a user 
guide, including software that 
confirms/finalises the model’s 
detailed procedures. This guide 
will include an appendix that 
comprises the trial project, and 
documents and reports arising 
from the trial project (subject 
to approval from the state 
government participating in the 
trial).
 » Assessment of differential costs and 
performance in PPPs and non-PPPs, 
and in the operational stage of facilities:
 › As indicated in the background 
to Objective #1, this assessment 
is of urgent importance and could 
be applied, for example, to the 
provision of school infrastructure.
 › This assessment would address 
a number of the Productivity 
Commission’s (2014a) concerns 
pertaining to the benefits 
of ex post value for money 
assessments and a number of 
the points under the Productivity 
Commission’s Recommendation 
#7.1. 
Finance theme 
 » New insights in the return and risk 
characteristics of unlisted infrastructure 
investments:
 › The rewards and risks associated 
with unlisted infrastructure.  Many 
infrastructure and PPP projects 
are financed with privately held 
equity that is not traded on a 
centralised stock exchange.  
Future research can examine 
whether unlisted infrastructure 
equity exhibits similar return 
and risk characteristics as listed 
infrastructure shares that is 
readily accessed and traded on a 
publicly listed stock exchange.
 › There is an expectation that 
privately owned infrastructure 
equity deliver higher rates of 
return than listed infrastructure 
shares as finance theory 
suggests that this additional 
return reflects the illiquditiy 
premium, that is, the 
compensation to investors for 
owning and holding an asset that 
cannot be readily sold or quickly 
converted into cash.  Future 
research can examine the level 
of additional return in owning 
unlisted equity and the additional 
risk borne by investors in owning 
these types of illiquid assets in 
comparison to publicly traded 
equity and/or debt securities.
 » Social infrastructure:
 › There is an interest by 
government and the private 
sector (superannuation funds) in 
better understanding the return 
and risk characteristics of ‘social 
infrastructure’ assets such as 
schools (and higher levels of 
education), hospitals, prisons 
and cultural assets (such as 
museums and art facilities). There 
is scope to better understand the 
differences in the risk properties 
of these assets in comparison 
to conventional or ‘economic 
infrastructure’ assets.
 › The non-profit focus of social 
infrastructure remains a 
challenge in the future. There is 
an opportunity for new research 
to discover new financing models 
to promote and encourage 
higher levels of private 
sector participation in social 
infrastructure and PPP projects.
Procurement and finance relationship 
 » On the basis that the current PPP 
model, Hybrid and Inverted Bid 
Model have potential relative merits 
with respect to different project 
characteristics, then exploring the role 
and outcomes of the Operator - with 
more or with less design influence and 
associated with the extent to which the 
Operator is appointed early, would be 
invaluable research in the deployment 
and development of the current 
PPP model and various alternative 
approaches being considered. 
 » Research into VfM outcomes from the 
Hybrid, Inverted Bid Model – or the like 
and other approaches to delivering a 
PPP as alternatives to the current model 
could be explored in due course.
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Project outputs
PRESENTATIONS
 » Associate Prof Bridge presented 
at the Department of Infrastructure: 
BITRE Colloquium, Parliament House, 
Canberra. 2009. “Delivering value 
for money in procuring infrastructure: 
towards addressing construction and 
financing constraints”.
SYMPOSIUM AND 
WORKSHOPS
 » Two-day symposium dedicated to this 
research grant (3 and 4 December 
2009) comprising:
 › Private meeting of COAG IWG 
Subgroup and National PPP 
Forum Working Party
 › Government-Industry lunch
 › Private project RAC meeting
 › IAQ and QUT networking 
event with national PPP Forum 
members and industry guests 
as panellists
 › A full-day seminar and 
workshop
 » International Workshop (3 December 
2010) on behalf of the International 
Council for Research and Innovation 
in Building and Construction (Working 
Commission W092 – Procurement 
Systems and Task Group TG72 – 
Public Private Partnerships), also 
dedicated to this research grant; 
“Major Infrastructure Procurement: 
Addressing the constraints”.
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